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Commercial and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) describe products that have 
been developed primarily for the use of the commercial industries or for the general 
public. The theory behind using commercial items in DoD applications is that products 
developed for commercial usage will be competitively priced, and because of the large 
user base, will be very low in unit price as compared to a product designed and developed 
specifically for DOD’s relatively low-volume usage. Also, in areas such as computers 
and software, commercial industry’s speed of technology development and acquisition 
surpass that which the Government has been able to achieve.  
As of January 2001, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & 
Logistics) (USD(AT&L)), mandated an increase in the utilization of commercial items as 
follows: (1) double the dollar value of FAR Part 12 contract actions awarded in 1999 by 
the end of fiscal year 2005, and (2) strive to increase the number of FAR Part 12 contract 
actions awarded to 50 percent of all Government contracts awarded by the end of FY 
2005.  A great deal of study, writing and analysis has gone into the utilization of 
commercial item software products but less is known about the utilization of commercial 
item equipment, which this thesis will primarily address.  
It is generally thought and accepted that the utilization of commercial equipment 
will substantially reduce cost and lead times necessary to get systems fielded.  However, 
there may be some significant disadvantages to utilization of commercial items that 
should be recognized, analyzed and for which corrective actions should be planned to 
mitigate the implementation risks.  
The objective of this thesis is to identify the critical PM and/or industry “issues” 
associated with integrating commercial items into a DoD acquisition program and to 
propose methods and process solutions that will alleviate many of the implementation 


































B.   SCOPE OF RESEARCH ................................................................................1 
C.   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...................................................................1 
D.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS.............................................................................2 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY ......................................................................3 
II. BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................5 
A. COMMERCIAL ITEMS DEFINED..............................................................5 
B.  BROADENED DEFINITION OF COMMERCIAL ITEMS ......................6 
C. COMMERCIAL ITEMS CLARIFIED .........................................................7 
D. DOD REGULATION 5000.1: COMMERCIAL ITEM 
REQUIREMENT.............................................................................................9 
E. MARKET RESEARCH ..................................................................................9 
F. COMMERCIAL ITEM USAGE CONCEPT .............................................10 
G. DOD COMMERCIAL ITEM REQUIREMENTS.....................................11 
H. USING COMMERCIAL ITEMS.................................................................12 
1. The marketplace, not the PM, drives development of the 
commercial product. ..........................................................................15 
2. A change of the commercial product (which is almost a 
certainty) will drastically affect program supportability...............15 
3. Integrating a commercial item into a program is 
fundamentally different from developing a custom product, 
and may require similar PM attention.............................................15 
4. Greater teamwork among stakeholders during the selection of 
commercial items from the marketplace is essential to keep the 
program on track. ..............................................................................15 
5. There must be a willingness to adapt the “requirements” to the 
capabilities available in the marketplace rather than adapting 
the commercial capabilities to the DoD “requirements.”...............16 
6. Commercial item usage means that many of the normal 
acquisition activities (such as system development and 
sustainment) will be repeated throughout the lifecycle of the 
program, because a commercial item is never really complete 
(i.e., it is always changing).................................................................16 
7. The product must be tested or verified to ensure that required 
capabilities are in fact met as promised by the commercial item 
manufacturer......................................................................................16 
I. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF USING COMMERCIAL ITEMS.............17 




B.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION .............................................................19 
1. Acquisition Strategy...........................................................................19 
2. Market Investigations........................................................................20 
3. Concept Formulation.........................................................................21 
4. Management of Integration ..............................................................21 
5. Logistics Support ...............................................................................22 
a. Reliability.................................................................................22 
b. Support Requirements.............................................................22 
c. Technical Data for Competitive Reprocurement ...................23 
6. Test and Evaluation ...........................................................................23 
7. Culture ................................................................................................25 
8. Army Definitions................................................................................26 
C.  COMMERCIAL ITEM USAGE ISSUES ...................................................27 
1. U.S. Army Audit Agency, NE 90-206, Acquisition of 
Nondevelopmental Items: U.S. Army Natick Research, 
Developmental and Engineering Center, Natick, 
Massachusetts. 19 March 1990 .........................................................27 
a. Acquisition Strategy ................................................................27 
b. Market Investigations .............................................................28 
c. Concept Formulation..............................................................29 
2. U.S. Army Audit Agency, NE 91-204, Acquisition of 
Nondevelopmental Items. 17 June 1991...........................................29 
a. Acquisition Strategy ................................................................29 
b. Market Investigations .............................................................30 
c. Concept Formulation..............................................................30 
d. Management of Integration....................................................30 
e. Logistics Support.....................................................................30 
3. U.S. Army Audit Agency, NE 90-209, Acquisition of 
Nondevelopmental Items: Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. 11 
September 1990 ..................................................................................32 
a. Acquisition Strategy ................................................................32 
b. Market Investigations .............................................................33 
c. Concept Formulation..............................................................33 
d. Test and Evaluation ................................................................33 
e. Logistics Support.....................................................................34 
4. Bonheim, Mike LTC, PM – Physical Security Equipment 
(PSE), Commercial Items Acquisition Data Call, 22 February 
2001......................................................................................................35 
a.  Needs Determination...............................................................35 
b. Reliability.................................................................................35 
c. Market Investigations .............................................................35 
d. Logistics Support.....................................................................36 
e. Test and Evaluation ................................................................36 
 viii 
5. GAO/NSIAD-95-161, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES: 
Maneuver System Schedule Includes Unnecessary Risk, 15 
September 1995 ..................................................................................36 
Test and Evaluation ............................................................................37 
6. GAO/NSIAD-96-2, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System 
Is Not Appropriate for Navy Fleet Use, 1 December 1995.............37 
Needs Determination...........................................................................37 
7. The DoD IG Report 96-111, Allegations Involving the 
Procurement of the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-Short-
Range System, 7 May 1996................................................................37 
a. Needs Determination...............................................................38 
b. Reliability.................................................................................38 
c. Test and Evaluation ................................................................39 
8. DoD IG Report 95-193, DoD Hotline Allegations Regarding the 
Naval Special Warfare Patrol Coastal Ship and the Rigid 
Inflatable Boat Acquisition Programs, 15 May 1995......................39 
a. Needs Determination...............................................................40 
b. Design......................................................................................40 
c. Risk Analysis ...........................................................................41 
d.  Test and Evaluation ...............................................................41 
D. COMMERCIAL ITEMS PROBLEMS, ISSUES AND 
CONSEQUENCES SUMMARY ..................................................................41 
IV. ANALYSIS – COMMERCIAL ITEM USAGE EXPERIENCE & 
PROBLEMS ...............................................................................................................45 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................45 
B.  ROOT CAUSE PROBLEMS AND ISSUES ...............................................45 
1. Inadequate Education or Training within the Acquisition 
Community .........................................................................................45 
2. Inadequate Use of Lessons Learned.................................................46 
3. Incorrect Culture-Driven Decision Making ....................................46 
C. ANALYSIS OF PROCESS PROBLEMS AND ISSUES ...........................46 
1. Needs Determination .........................................................................46 
2. Market Investigation .........................................................................48 
3. Concept Formulation.........................................................................49 
4. Risk Analysis ......................................................................................49 
5. Acquisition Strategy...........................................................................49 
6. Design..................................................................................................50 
7. Management of Integration ..............................................................51 
8.  Test and Evaluation ...........................................................................51 
9. Logistics Support ...............................................................................52 
a. Reliability.................................................................................52 
b. Support Requirements.............................................................54 
c. Technical Data for Competitive Reprocurement ...................54 
D. COMMERCIAL ITEM - CAUSE - SUMMARY .......................................55 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................59 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................59 
 ix 
B. METHODS AND PROCESSES “BEST PRACTICE” 
CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................59 
1. Lessons Learned.................................................................................59 
2. Culture-Driven Mistakes...................................................................59 
3. Training and Education ....................................................................60 
4. Needs Determination .........................................................................61 
5. Acquisition Strategy...........................................................................61 
6. Market Investigation .........................................................................62 
7. Concept Formulation.........................................................................62 
8. Risk Analysis ......................................................................................63 
9. Design..................................................................................................63 
10. Management of Integration ..............................................................64 
11.  Test and Evaluation ...........................................................................64 
12. Logistics Support ...............................................................................65 
a. Reliability.................................................................................65 
b. Support Requirements.............................................................66 
c. Technical Data for Competitive Reprocurement ...................66 
C. COMMERCIAL ITEM SUMMARY ..........................................................66 
D. COMMERCIAL ITEM BEST PRACTICE SUMMARY .........................69 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................72 
F. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.......................................................73 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................75 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................79 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................81 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................83 
 
 x 




Figure 1. Defense Acquisition Management Framework  (From: DoDI 5000.2)...........13 



































LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1 Commercial Item Consequence Matrix ...........................................................41 
Table 2 Commercial Item Cause Matrix.......................................................................55 



























































I wish to acknowledge the direction, support and guidance given to me by my 
sponsor, LTC Michael Bonheim, PM-PSE.  Without his topic idea and the data he 
provided, this thesis would not have been written. 
Next, I wish to thank my thesis advisors, Professor Michael Boudreau and Dr. 
Richard Doyle, who have given generously of their time, experience and knowledge to 
improve upon the form, structure and knowledge contained in this thesis.  
A great deal of the data contained in this thesis came from the DoD Inspector 
General (IG), General Accounting Office (GAO), and the Army Audit Agency. Most of 
the reports were obtained directly from the agencies. I wish to thank those people that 
provided swift responses by mailing hard copies or emailing electronic copies of data to 
me, as follows: 
DoD IG    Carol L. Hopper  
DoD IG    John E. Meling  
Army Audit Agency    Pamela B. Evans 
During my thesis research, I spent untold hours in the NPS Dudley Knox Library, 
and received research help from virtually everyone that works at the reference desk, my 
thanks to them all. Special thanks go to Ann Jacobson who taught me how to access and 
use Lexus-Nexus. 
Lastly, to the one who put up with me and supported me throughout this effort, 
who read and reread every page, my gratitude and thanks go to my best friend, my wife, 
Judith Meyer. Without her unwavering support and editorial help my thesis advisors 








































It is generally accepted that the utilization of commercial items will substantially 
reduce cost and lead times necessary to get systems fielded.  However, there may be 
significant downsides and drawbacks to utilization of commercial items that should be 
recognized, analyzed and for which corrective actions should be planned to mitigate the 
implementation risks.  
The purpose and objective of this thesis is to identify many of the Program 
Managers’ (PM) or industries’ critical “issues” associated with implementing and 
integrating commercial items into a DoD program. The researcher will also propose 
process solutions that may alleviate many of the problems and thereby help mitigate 
commercial item implementation risks.   
B.   SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
 The scope will include: (1) a review of DoD regulations as they relate to 
commercial items, (2) an in-depth review of the available commercial items literature, (3) 
a compilation and evaluation of adverse experiences by PMs and industries using 
commercial items from DoD audit reports and (4) an analysis of the audit results of the 
PMs and industry implementing current DoD’s commercial item policies. The thesis will 
conclude with a recommendation of methods and processes that work effectively when 
utilizing commercial items in DoD programs.  
C.   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The data for this study was obtained from several sources. First, the researcher 
conducted an extensive review of available literature. This literature review consisted of a 
search of books, journal articles, microfiche, the worldwide web and other library 
information resources pertaining to commercial items. Finally, the researcher conducted a 
thorough review of the Internet for current DoD policies, regulations and audit reports 
relating to commercial item implementation. 
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Secondly, telephone interviews were conducted with major DoD acquisition 
agencies involved in the commercial item acquisition process. These agencies included 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Logistics and Technology, USD(AL&T), 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform, DUSD(AR), Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, ASA(AT&L), and 
Headquarters Army Material Command, HQAMC, where it was determined that there 
was no current, consolidated, PM commercial item usage data available. Telephone 
interviews were also conducted with a small number of PM and industry personnel in 
order to identify current problems and issues being experienced with commercial item 
utilization. 
 Thirdly, a consolidated data call was obtained from Communication Electronics 
Command (CECOM), which contained issue papers from three Program Managers (PM): 
PM-Physical Security Equipment, (PM-PSE); PM-Defense Communications and Army 
Switched Systems, (PM-DCASS); and PM-Global Positioning System, (PM-GPS); and 
from the Competition Management Division Legal Office. [SMC] 
 Finally, additional data was obtained from General Accounting Office (GAO), 
Army Audit Agency (AAA), and Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) 
audit reports.  
D.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To achieve the objectives of this study, the primary research question was as follows: 
What are the most important problems and solutions associated with the use of 
commercial products within defense acquisition? 
From the basic research question, the following subsidiary questions were developed: 
1.   What is the definition of commercial items and their relevance to DoD? 
2.   What are DoD’s requirements and objectives regarding commercial item  
      usage? 
3.   What are the critical problems or issues confronted by PMs utilizing  
      commercial items? 
4.   How can PM problems or issues utilizing commercial items be resolved? 
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E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
 The researcher will first review the background of commercial items and the DoD 
commercial item requirements in some detail in Chapter II. In Chapter III, the Program 
Managers’ and industries’ experiences utilizing commercial products within their DoD 
programs will be identified and categorized for further study. In Chapter IV, the PM and 
industry critical problems and issues are analyzed.  In Chapter V, potential process 
































A. COMMERCIAL ITEMS DEFINED 
 The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines the terms “commercial item” 
and “nondevelopmental item” as follows: 
 1. Commercial Item  
a. Any item, other then real property, that is of a type 
customarily used for nongovernmental purposes and that 
has been sold, leased, or licensed to the general public, or 
has been offered for sale, lease or license to the general 
public. 
 
b. Any item that evolved from an item described in paragraph 
a, above through advances in technology or performance 
that is not yet available in the commercial market in time to 
meet the delivery requirements of the solicitation; but will 
be available in the commercial marketplace in time to 
satisfy the delivery requirements under a Government 
solicitation. 
 
c. Any item that, but for modifications of a type customarily 
available in the commercial market or minor modifications 
made to meet DoD requirements, would satisfy the criteria 
in paragraph a or b, above, etc. 
[FAR Part 2] 
 
 2. Nondevelopmental Item 
 
Any previously developed item used exclusively for 
governmental purposes by a Federal agency, a State or 
local government, or a foreign government with which the 
U.S. has a mutual defense cooperation agreement.     
[FAR Part 2] 
 
 Because the specific emphasis within DoD is to increase the utilization of 
commercial items, and nondevelopmental items (NDI) are placed second in the priority 
of implementation, this thesis will only address commercial item usage. NDI literature 
will be reviewed inasmuch as problems experienced utilizing NDI, will for the most part, 
apply to commercial item usage as well.  Also, there is a great deal of indiscriminate and 
imprecise terminology usage. Thus, when the term “NDI” is used, the literature may 
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actually be referring to a commercial item. The specific study of nondevelopmental items 
will be excluded from this study, but many of the problems and issues found when 
utilizing commercial items also apply when using nondevelopmental items. Thus, the 
same types of precautionary and risk-reducing tactics as recommended in this thesis for 
commercial items may be used when acquiring nondevelopmental items.   
 Government Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) is also a commonly used term for 
nondevelopmental items (NDI) that are government-unique items in use by federal, state 
or other governmental agency or by a foreign government with which the United States 
has a mutual defense cooperation agreement. This area will also be excluded and this 
term will not be utilized in this thesis. 
 Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) is a familiar and well-used term within 
industry and DoD. However, there is no definition of COTS in the FAR Part 2.  As used, 
COTS is traditionally defined as its name implies, i.e., a commercial item that is 
purchased off the commercial shelf without any modification whatsoever. This term will 
not be used in this thesis except where quoted, in favor of the broader term Commercial 
Item that includes COTS as a subset. 
B.  BROADENED DEFINITION OF COMMERCIAL ITEMS 
 The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and the Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996 broadened the definition of a commercial item. 
As they redefined it, systems, subsystems, and components other than real property are 
considered commercial items or modified commercial items if they are of a type that can 
be categorized into one of the following areas: 
 1. Has been offered for sale, sold, leased, or licensed to the general public. 
 2. Evolved through technology or performance advances and will be 
available in the commercial marketplace in time to meet proposed Government delivery 
requirements. 
 3. Required modification of a type customarily available in the commercial 
marketplace or required minor modification of a type not customarily available in the 
commercial marketplace to meet DoD requirements. 
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 Besides broadening the definition of commercial items, the 1994 FASA and 1996 
FARA Acts enabled DoD to revise and modify acquisition regulations. DoD was in a 
position to: 
 1. Simplify contracting procedures for acquisitions not costing more than $5 
million, when contracting officers reasonably believe that only commercial items will be 
offered; 
 2. Exempt the contract requirement to provide cost or pricing data for 
commercial items; 
 3. Give contracting officers flexibility in determining price reasonableness 
for contracts, subcontracts, and modifications; 
 4. Provide contracting officers a list of Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) provisions that are not applicable for commercially available items; and 
 5. Remove more than 30 contractor certification requirements that are not 
specifically imposed by statue. 
[FARA, FASA] 
C. COMMERCIAL ITEMS CLARIFIED 
  On January 5, 2001, Dr. J. S. Gansler, then Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, issued a policy memorandum to clarify and to 
help overcome some of the barriers being experienced within the Department of Defense 
in utilizing commercial items. An Integrated Process Team (IPT) had been formed at his 
direction and was headed by both the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
Reform (DUSD (AR)) and the Director of Defense Procurement. The IPT was chartered 
to review DoD commercial item determinations and evaluate whether additional 
guidance, tools, or training were necessary. Dr. Gansler’s memorandum says that the IPT 
found “inconsistent commercial item determination and weak market research among the 
obstacles that exist to broadening the use of commercial items within the DoD.” [DoD. 
USD(AT&L), 5 January 2001]  
 Dr. Gansler’s memorandum also provided clarifying definitions of FAR Part 12 
for greater consistency within DoD.  Three of the most important of these are as follows: 
 Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS): A product does not have to be 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) to meet the “commercial item” 
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definition. COTS items are a subset of commercial items. The commercial 
item definition is much broader than products that are presently available 
off-the-shelf. It includes items that have only been “offered” for sale, 
lease, or license to the general public, as well as those that have evolved 
from a commercial item and are offered for sale, even if not yet available 
in the commercial marketplace. However, evolved items must be available 
in the commercial marketplace in time to satisfy solicitation delivery 
requirements. In addition, all other elements of the commercial item 
definition at FAR 2.101 must also be met.  
 
Modified Commercial Items: When items available in the commercial 
market cannot meet the Department’s need, DoD must determine whether 
market items can be or have been modified so that FAR Part 12 can be 
used.  Two types of modifications are available: (1) modifications of a 
type available in the commercial marketplace; and, (2) minor 
modifications of a type not customarily available in the commercial 
marketplace made to Federal Government requirements. For modifications 
of a type available in the commercial marketplace, the size or extent of 
modifications is unimportant. For minor modifications, the item must 
retain a predominance of nongovernmental functions or physical 
characteristics. 
 
“Of a Type”: The phrase “of a type” is not intended to allow the use of 
FAR Part 12 to acquire sole-source, military unique items that are not 
closely related to items already in the marketplace. Instead, “of a type” 
broadens the commercial item definition so that qualifying items do not 
have to be identical to those in the commercial marketplace. The best 
value offer in a competitive Part 12 solicitation can be an item that has 
previously satisfied the Government’s need but has not been sold, leased, 
licensed, nor offered for sale, lease or license to the general public (a 
nondevelopmental item as defined in 10 USC 403 (13). In this scenario, 
the phrase “of a type” allows the best value offer to qualify for a Part 12 
contract as long as it is sufficiently like similar items that meet the 
government’s requirement and are sold, leased, licensed, or offered for 
sale, lease or license to the general public. In such instances, “of a type” 
broadens the statutory commercial item definition to allow Part 12 
acquisition of a government-unique item that can compete with 
commercial items that meet the government’s requirement. This avoids the 
undesirable result of shutting out otherwise price-competitive preexisting 
suppliers of government-unique items from Part 12 solicitations. 
[DoD. USD(AT&L), 5 January 2001] 
 
 Since COTS has been defined as a subset of “commercial items” and Dr. 
Gansler’s memorandum specifically addresses the broader scope of commercial items, 
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this researcher will use the term “commercial item(s)” throughout this thesis and the term 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) will not be used. 
 A memorandum titled Commercial Acquisitions, dated 26 March 2001, was 
issued by the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics & 
Technology, incorporating a plan titled, “Implementation Plan for Increasing the Use of 
FAR Part 12”. The plan announced a policy that all contractually provided services (with 
the exception of services under FAR Part 36) were presumed to be commercial and that 
FAR Part 12 policies and procedures would be used to buy those services. The plan 
further states, “For those services where the results of market research indicate that the 
service is not commercial, the local Competition Advocate must approve the commercial 
determination.” (ASAAL&T) This plan puts even more emphasis on the utilization of 
commercial items within the Army, which may open the way for all DoD. 
D. DOD REGULATION 5000.1: COMMERCIAL ITEM REQUIREMENT 
 Government regulation echoes the statutory preference for commercial items and 
indicates their importance to DoD. The best evidence of this is DoDR 5000.1, as noted 
below. 
 
In response to user requirements, priority consideration shall always be 
given to the most cost-effective solution over the system’s life cycle. In 
general, decision-makers, users, and program managers shall first consider 
the procurement of commercially available products, services, and 
technologies, or the development of dual-use technologies, to satisfy user 
requirements, and shall work together to modify requirements, whenever 
feasible, to facilitate such procurements. Market research and analysis 
shall be conducted to determine the availability, suitability, operational 
supportability, interoperability, and ease of integration of existing 
commercial technologies and products and of non-developmental items 
prior to the commencement of a development effort.  
[DoD Directive 5000.1, paragraph 4.2.3] 
E. MARKET RESEARCH 
 Market research is the process of collecting and analyzing data about the products 
and technologies available in the marketplace. The market research IPT then determines 
which product or technology satisfies the agencies procurement needs. Market research 
has been a statutory requirement for almost 20 years, since the passage of the 
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984. This act requires the use of market research and 
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procurement planning to promote the use of competitive procedures in federal 
contracting.   
In November 1990, Congress reemphasized market research for the DoD in the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101-510).  The goal of 
this act was to encourage DoD to save money and reduce acquisition cycle time by 
buying products that were commercially available or had already been developed. 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 stipulated that all 
federal executive agencies must conduct market research before developing new 
specifications for procurement or soliciting bids for contracts exceeding $100,000.  
FASA (Section 8104, paragraph 2377 of Public Law 103-355) requires heads of agencies 
to use the results of market research to determine whether there are commercial items 
available that meet the agency’s requirements, if those requirements were modified to a 
reasonable extent. For example, if a requirement specifies that an aircraft must meet a 
maximum speed of 100 mph but there is a commercial item available with maximum 
speed of 90 mph, the requirements community must seriously consider reducing that 
requirement so that the commercial item can be used. If suitable commercial items are 
not available, the agency will then use nondevelopmental items.  
 The FAR implemented those market research provisions and essentially 
established market research as a tool for identifying sources to ensure competition as well 
as commercial products to meet an agency’s needs. FAR Part 10 requires that agencies 
conduct market research appropriate to the circumstances before developing new 
acquisition requirements documents. If market research establishes that a commercial 
item cannot fill the Government’s need, agencies are required by FAR 10.002(c) to 
reevaluate the requirement for possible restatement to enable use of commercial or 
nondevelopmental items, as defined in FAR 2.101. The findings of market research must 
be documented per FAR 10.002 (e). 
F. COMMERCIAL ITEM USAGE CONCEPT  
The concept behind greatly expanding the usage of commercial items in DoD 
applications is best explained in a study produced by the USD(AT&L), as follows:  
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 Expanding the use of commercial items in Department of Defense (DoD) 
systems offers the DoD opportunities for reduced cycle time, faster 
insertion of new technology, lower life cycle costs, greater reliability and 
availability, and support from a more robust industrial base. 
[DoD. ODUSD(AR), 14 July 2000] 
 
Because of the competitive pressures experienced by commercial manufactures to 
remain in business, they are forced to develop and produce the best possible quality 
products at the most competitive cost. DoD, therefore, will reap the benefits and get the 
best value without expending the time and funds necessary to develop, test and field a 
similar product. Also, in areas such as computers and software, the speed of technological 
development and acquisition by commercial industry surpasses that which the 
Government has been able to achieve. Therefore, commercial items will save the DoD 
both time and money, as well as keeping them technologically competitive.   
Clearly, the mandate of the USD(AT&L) is for DoD to dramatically increase the 
utilization of commercial items to improve the acquisition process by speeding it up, 
reducing costs, and keeping pace with commercial technology development. As the 
USD(AT&L) memorandum says: 
 
To the maximum extent possible, commercial acquisitions should be 
conducted using FAR Part 12. The use of FAR Part 12 is designed to 
provide the Department of Defense (DoD) with greater access to 
commercial markets with increased competition, better prices, and new 
market entrants and/or technologies.  
[DoD. USD(AT&L), 5 January 2001] 
G. DOD COMMERCIAL ITEM REQUIREMENTS  
USD(AT&L’s) memorandum of January 5, 2001 provided further specific 
commercial item acquisition dollar-value goals for DoD to meet. The two most important 
of these are quoted as follows: 
 
 1. Each Service and Defense Agency should double the dollar value 
of FAR Part 12 contract actions awarded in 1999 by the end of fiscal year 
(FY) 2005.  This would bring the DoD total FAR Part 12 contract actions 
from $12.6 billion to $25.2 billion.* 
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2. Each Service and Defense Agency should strive to increase the 
number of FAR Part 12 contract actions awarded to 50 percent of all 
Government contract awarded by the end of FY 2005.* 
 
*For purposes of these goals, a contract action is defined as any new 
contract award and/or new delivery order placed against a contract 
awarded with a value greater than $25,000.  
[DoD. USD(AT&L), 5 January 2001] 
 
In support of these objectives, Dr. Gansler’s memorandum tasked the DUSD(AR) 
to track the Department of Defense progress in meeting these goals. He also requested 
that the DUSD(AR) and the Director of Defense Procurement charter an Integrated 
Process Team (IPT) to: “determine the feasibility of establishing a pilot program so that 
the Services and Agencies may collect market research and Commercial Item 
Determinations in a central database, or developing tools to assist in ensuring commercial 
item determinations are reasonably consistent.” [DoD. USD(ATL), 5 January 2001] 
It is clear that it is DoD policy to strongly encourage the utilization of commercial 
items in the DoD acquisition process.  In support of using commercial items and in order 
to shorten the time it takes to complete an acquisition, the process of trading user “gold 
plated” requirements for commercial items is an option that must be strongly considered. 
However, any such tradeoffs must be critically examined in order that real user needs, 
necessary to meet emerging threats, are not sacrificed for the commercial item goal. 
H. USING COMMERCIAL ITEMS 
The use of commercial items in DoD is not new; many programs have used 
commercial items to some extent. For example, a vehicle program might use commercial 
tires and batteries, with everything else developed especially for the Government 
program.  Or a complete program, such as a truck, might be a slightly modified 
commercial item.  The extent of commercial item usage varies from program to program.  
With the new emphasis on using commercial items within DoD, a new paradigm of 
system acquisition thinking is being created.  The 2001 system acquisition management 
process graphic representation from DoDI 5000.2 is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.   Defense Acquisition Management Framework  
(From: DoDI 5000.2) 
 
The model process is separated into three segments: pre-systems acquisition, 
systems acquisition, and sustainment.  This process is then broken down contextually, by 
OSD, into the Traditional Model, as shown in Figure 2. The Traditional Model consists 
of three segments as follows: 1) System Context, which includes the requirements 
definition and concept exploration phases of systems acquisition, 2) Architecture & 
Design, which includes the design & development phase of systems acquisition, and 3) 
Implementation, which includes the building, fielding and supporting phases of the 
acquisition system. This Traditional Model is then transposed into the Recommended 
Model, which overlaps the three areas above and overlays the process of Simultaneous 
Definition and Tradeoffs as the new paradigm for increased utilization of commercial 
items within DoD programs. As the OSD says, “increased reliance on commercial items 
implies a different paradigm of systems acquisition.” [DoD. ODUSD(AR), pg 3, 14 July 
2000]  
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The greatest difference between the two models shown in Figure 2 is that greater 
interaction is required between the system context, architecture and design segments 
when using commercial items, as shown by the overlapping of contextual areas.  This 
new model indicates that there is a greater need for use of Integrated Product/Process 
Development (IPPD) and IPTs as the overlapping areas indicate. As the OSD states: 
“Managing this interaction requires unprecedented cooperation among the program 
office, the stakeholders, the contractor, and in many cases the vendor in order to effect 
the tradeoffs necessary to keep the program on track.” [DoD. ODUSD(AR), pg 3, 14 July 
2000] 
 
   Traditional Model      Recommended Model 
 
Figure 2.   Traditional Model vs. Recommended Model 
    (From: ODUSD(AR), pg 3, 7/14/2000) 
 
 
PMs must not only manage a traditional system but now must also integrate the 
selection of commercial items in varying degrees into their program, along with all of the 
problems associated with commercial item usage. Many acquisition programs have had 
problems or have failed due to a lack of consideration for the uniqueness of commercial 
item usage in their programs, as well as inattention to the differences noted below. 
Some of the most important new paradigm considerations and issues a PM must 
deal with are as follows: 
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1. The marketplace, not the PM, drives development of the commercial 
product.  
The commercial marketplace is driven by customer demand, customer satisfaction 
and competition. Because DoD’s demand for commercial products is such a small portion 
of total commercial demand, DoD cannot dictate development to commercial producers. 
Using software as an example, it is noted that, “DoD accounts for less than 1% of the 
U.S. market, and less than 0.6% of the international market.” [Anderson, pg. 4, 1998] 
2. A change of the commercial product (which is almost a certainty) will 
drastically affect program supportability. 
Change is the norm in the commercial item marketplace, and must be carefully 
planned for by PMs when using commercial items in their programs. Planning for 
program supportability over the expected life cycle of the product is critical. A method 
for handling obsolescence should be devised, such as preplanning product improvement 
or upgrading commercial items with new technology insertion along with retirement of 
the obsolete items. Another method cited by ODUSD(AR) was “by adopting an open 
system architecture with modular designs, maintaining close relationships with 
commercial item vendors, and monitoring the marketplace, one particularly successful 
program not only avoided technological obsolescence, but also developed a “sparing” 
model that reduced the cost of spare components by 40%.” [DoD. ODUSD(AR), pg. 17, 
14 July 2000] 
3. Integrating a commercial item into a program is fundamentally 
different from developing a custom product, and may require similar PM attention. 
In the development of a custom product, the PM dictates the behavior of 
components and interfaces among components. However, as ODUSD(AR) indicates, 
“Program managers who use commercial items have little insight into how the 
commercial items are put together, how they behave, and why.” [DoD. ODUSD(AR), pg. 
5, 14 July 2000] 
4. Greater teamwork among stakeholders during the selection of 
commercial items from the marketplace is essential to keep the program on track. 
There is a dynamic interaction necessary between stakeholders when using 
commercial items in order to adequately perform commercial item market research, 
  15
determination and, if necessary, modification of user requirements, establishment of 
commercial item logistic support requirements and determination of system reliability. 
As ODUSD(AR) states, “Managing this interaction requires unprecedented cooperation 
among the program office, the stakeholders, the contractor, and in many cases the vendor 
in order to effect the tradeoffs necessary to keep the program on track.” [DoD. 
ODUSD(AR), pg. 3, 14 July 2000] 
5. There must be a willingness to adapt the “requirements” to the 
capabilities available in the marketplace rather than adapting the commercial 
capabilities to the DoD “requirements.” 
Paring down requirements to those absolutely essential to the program, as 
opposed to those “nice to have,” will allow for requirements flexibility to enable 
choosing an acceptable commercial item. 
ODUSD(AR) notes that, “Requirements specification must be flexible and 
negotiable. A traditional development model that specifies all system requirements prior 
to considering the capabilities available in the marketplace is ill suited to the 
development of systems incorporating commercial items.” [DoD. ODUSD(AR), pg. 8, 14 
July 2000] 
6. Commercial item usage means that many of the normal acquisition 
activities (such as system development and sustainment) will be repeated throughout 
the lifecycle of the program, because a commercial item is never really complete 
(i.e., it is always changing). 
Frequent change in the commercial item’s configuration will mean constant 
monitoring of the impact to the program, as indicated by ODUSD(AR): “However, new, 
changed, and obsolete commercial items necessitate repeated cycles of requirement 
definition, commercial item evaluation, and system engineering. Some form of 
replanning and reengineering will be ongoing throughout the life of the system.” [DoD. 
ODUSD(AR), pg. 5, 14 July 2000] 
7. The product must be tested or verified to ensure that required 
capabilities are in fact met as promised by the commercial item manufacturer. 
A commercial item’s capability may not always be as stated, and should always 
be verified. As noted by ODUSD(AR), “Another program that was using multiple 
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commercial items found that even basic, advertised capabilities of commercial items had 
to be tested before the program could begin its planned integration testing.” [DoD. 
ODUSD(AR), pg. 18, 14 July 2000] 
I. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF USING COMMERCIAL ITEMS 
There are unique obstacles when using commercial items. However, when 
addressed correctly, the benefits can far outweigh the risks. Programs have documented 
great savings of time and money when the unique challenges encountered by the use of 
commercial items have been adequately addressed. However, the use of commercial 
items does not reduce or eliminate the risks associated with the traditional acquisition 
processes. It is critical that the overall system be guided through all the traditional 
acquisition processes of engineering, development, integration, testing, delivery and 
sustainment, and that each program be well managed. As the ODUSD(AR) states, “While 
there are significant benefits, these benefits can be attained only by understanding and 
addressing the significant new challenges that are driven by the fundamental differences 
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III. PM & INDUSTRY COMMERCIAL ITEM USAGE 
EXPERIENCE & PROBLEMS 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will document many of the PM and industry “issues” associated with 
implementing and integrating commercial items into a DoD program. These issues come 
from several sources, such as the Army Audit Agency, General Accounting Office 
(GAO), DoD Inspector General (DoD IG), and data from a CECOM PM.  
Issues will be presented by audit agency report or issue paper topic and then 
segregated, when applicable, into the acquisition topic areas as follows: needs 
determination; acquisition strategy; market investigation; concept formulation; risk 
analysis; management of integration; test and evaluation; logistics support, including 
reliability; support requirements; and technical data for competitive reprocurement.  
B.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION   
In many of the referenced Army documents that follow, the term 
“nondevelopmental item” is used synonymously with the term “commercial item” as 
previously defined in this thesis. Where the term, “nondevelopmental item” is used in the 
documentation, it will be replaced with “commercial item” throughout this portion of the 
research, except when “nondevelopmental item” is used in a quotation. 
Since understanding the issues presented herein requires some understanding of 
the acquisition process areas discussed, basic definitions are provided below for each of 
the following concepts: requirements determination; acquisition strategy; market 
investigation; concept formulation; management of integration; test and evaluation; and 
logistics support, which includes: reliability, support requirements, and technical data for 
competitive reprocurement. 
1. Acquisition Strategy 
All major material acquisition programs require an acquisition strategy. In the 
Army, for example, the material developer prepares the acquisition strategy during the 
concept exploration phase, prior to being approved at the milestone I/A decision point. 
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The acquisition strategy documents the approach for satisfying a requirement that 
includes plans and justifications for streamlining the acquisition process - that is, plans to 
shorten or eliminate any of the acquisition phases. The goal of the material developer is 
to tailor the strategy to create the shortest path through the acquisition process that will 
successfully satisfy the material requirement. 
   If the acquisition strategy is not accurately identified early in the process, 
incorrect phases of the acquisition process will be applied to one of the following: the 
system, the part, the component, or to the integration of all these into a system. Any 
streamlining that occurs which eliminates acquisition phases or steps in the commercial 
item acquisition process must be fully addressed in the acquisition strategy. The 
treatment of basic low-risk, off-the-shelf commercial items as medium or high-risk 
commercial items will add unnecessary delay and cost to the project. Likewise, if high or 
medium-risk projects are categorized and treated incorrectly, they will not be processed 
correctly. Potentially, additional cost and time will be incurred because these projects 
have not been tested and evaluated properly, or had other program risks that have not 
been properly addressed. Acquisition strategies should also be updated and resubmitted 
promptly when conditions change significantly. This will allow decision-makers to 
properly assess the impact of such changes. Users of the items should be involved early 
in the acquisition process in order to fully understand the nature, potential limitations, 
and advantages of commercial and nondevelopmental items. Only in this way can the 
user and acquisition community maintain the flexibility that is needed in establishing 
requirements to make effective use of commercial items and nondevelopmental items in 
their programs. 
2. Market Investigations 
Current DoD policy encourages the use of commercial products. However, 
procurement agencies have the burden of determining whether commercial items are 
available. This process is called market research.  
Market research consists of two related techniques: market surveillance and 
market investigation. Market surveillance is used to maintain a current knowledge of 
market availability within a particular area of technical expertise. Market investigations 
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evaluate commercial items in the marketplace to determine whether they can meet 
specific military requirements, or whether a new acquisition development project should 
be initiated.  
Market research is defined in more detail in chapter II, paragraph E, of this thesis. 
Market investigations should satisfy three criteria as follows: (1) identify all potential 
commercial item or nondevelopmental item sources (which includes other military 
services, other governmental agencies and allied countries), (2) be coordinated with 
independent evaluation activities, and (3) obtain enough actual test and performance data, 
if applicable, to assess critical issues relating to the operational suitability of the 
commercial or nondevelopmental item. 
3. Concept Formulation 
The materiel developers (U.S. Army Materiel Command) and the combat 
developers (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) jointly prepare the concept 
formulation package in the Army acquisition process. The concept package includes a 
tradeoff determination and a best technical approach, which are prepared by the material 
developers. It also includes an Analysis of Alternatives, which is completed by the 
combat developers. The concept formulation process provides the initial up-front and 
early data for defining and approving the material requirements documents and 
supporting program decisions, including analysis of acquisition strategies. A joint process 
is used to ensure that the material requirements are realistic, affordable and analytically 
supported. These analyses, along with the market investigation, form the basis for 
development of a sound acquisition strategy and formal requirements document.  
4. Management of Integration 
Integration projects - that is, projects that may use commercial items but have to 
integrate components or systems to work together - can be high-risk, complex and costly 
acquisition efforts and therefore must be managed appropriately. If integration projects 
are not identified properly, there will be high risk of a program experiencing technical 
problems and not meeting user requirements. Integration projects usually present the 
greatest challenges and are among the highest risk programs that utilize commercial 
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items. The adverse results could impact costs and schedules as well as not meeting user 
requirements, resulting in potential mission failure. 
5. Logistics Support 
Logistics support planning is a process that should commence early in a new 
acquisition program. The goal is to influence material system requirements and design in 
order to ensure that the system has optimum reliability and life cycle costs (LCC) - in 
other words, maximum reliability and minimum life cycle costs. Poor logistics support 
planning could result in inadequate logistics support, which in turn could adversely affect 
the system’s readiness and cost. 
a. Reliability 
Reliability is defined as the “probability that, when operating under stated 
conditions, the system or component will perform its intended function adequately for a 
specified period of time.” [Air Force Space and Missile Command, pg. 1, 14 August 
1998] 
In programs involving R&D, a major issue that developers must consider 
is system reliability. Reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) are key LCC 
drivers. RAM must be addressed early in the acquisition process by establishing 
reliability requirements that determine whether the system is economically supportable 
over its entire life cycle and is able to achieve required readiness levels.  
If the reliability of a commercial item is not verified as being able to meet 
the user’s requirements, then the system’s LCC and readiness will be severely impacted. 
Lower reliability greatly impacts the support costs, system availability and thus, mission 
accomplishment.  RAM requirements must be established early in order to enable the 
adequate testing of commercial items or nondevelopmental items. Quantitative reliability, 
availability and maintainability requirements should be established for all commercial 
items, with the exception of passive commercial items with no identifiable failures. 
b. Support Requirements 
Support requirements have to do with the way the system is maintained. It 
can be supported by either a contractor supply and maintenance system or a military 
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organic (in-house) supply and maintenance system. Contractor or organic support 
requirements must be analyzed via cost-benefit analysis methodology in order to justify 
the selected support decision.  Support requirements specifically address how commercial 
items will be maintained and supported when fielded due to the fact that Government 
access to commercial item technical data will most likely be limited. Consequently, 
availability of supplied parts may cease before the intended military lifecycles of the 
items expire. Support requirements analysis is crucial, since military systems are kept in 
the operational inventory far longer then the lifespan of most commercial items.  
 c. Technical Data for Competitive Reprocurement 
Technical data comes in many forms, including technical maintenance and 
operating manuals, engineering drawings and specifications, repair parts lists, and special 
tool lists, to name a few. All acquisition programs require technical data to some degree 
for logistics support of the system. The data that is acquired for a new program should be 
tailored to the specific and well planned needs of the program. Generally, the need for 
technical data to support reprocurement decisions should be made via economic analysis, 
which will indicate the best overall strategy for obtaining spare parts or replacement 
systems. As previously mentioned, Government access to commercial item or 
nondevelopmental item technical data will most likely be limited, and availability of parts 
supplied may cease before the intended military lifecycles of the items expire. An 
analysis of the program’s future requirements for technical data is essential, since 
military systems are kept in the operational inventory far longer then the lifespan of most 
commercial items. Thus, there must be some provisions made for the supply of spare 
parts after the commercial items have become obsolete in the commercial marketplace. 
6. Test and Evaluation 
The purposes of test and evaluation in the development of a defense system and 
its acquisition process are the following: to determine the feasibility of conceptual 
approaches in order to minimize design risk, to identify design alternatives, compare and 
analyze tradeoffs, and to estimate operational effectiveness and suitability. As a system 
progresses through design and development, the emphasis in testing moves gradually 
from development test and evaluation (DT&E) - which is chiefly concerned with the 
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attainment of engineering design goals - to operational test and evaluation (OT&E), 
which focuses on questions of operational effectiveness, suitability, and supportability.   
DT&E is normally planned and conducted by the developing agency during the 
concept and technology development phase to assist in the selection of the preferred 
alternative system concepts, technologies, and designs. During the system development 
and demonstration phase, DT&E demonstrates that engineering is reasonably complete, 
that all significant design problems are in hand, and that the design meets its required 
specifications in all areas, such as performance, reliability, and maintainability.  
The purpose of OT&E is to verify that only operationally effective and 
operationally suitable systems are approved for production, thereby meeting both mission 
needs and the minimum operational performance requirements of the user.  For major 
systems, OT&E is normally planned and conducted by a major OT&E field agency 
located within the DoD component. This operational test agency must be separate and 
independent from the developing/procuring agency.  
Operational testing is the primary means of evaluating system performance in a 
combat representative environment. It is structured to determine the operational 
effectiveness and suitability of a system, as well as to determine if the minimum 
acceptable operational performance requirements have been satisfied.  
Operational effectiveness refers to the ability of a system to accomplish its 
mission in the planned operational environment. Suitability is the degree to which a 
system can be placed satisfactorily in field use, taking into account such factors as the 
system’s reliability and maintainability. [DSMC, January 1990] 
In the commercial arena, commercial items may already have test data available; 
however, unless the data has been verified by an independent evaluator it should not be 
accepted.  
In all usage of commercial items in major programs, OT must be performed in 
order to verify or establish the system’s performance in the representative operational 
wartime environment.   
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7. Culture 
It has been found that culture plays a key role in many negative decisions that are 
made in the acquisition community. As used here, culture can be defined as the 
background, mores, traditions and customs, or way of life of a group.  
In the acquisition arena, there are many key players and contributors to the PM’s 
mores, traditions, and way of life. Some of the key players are the military chain-of-
command, the Congressional and military budgeters, the program’s contractor, the 
Government contracting agency, the program decision authority, the user community, 
and the test community, all with needs that may diverge and actually threaten program 
success.  
For example, there are Congressional budget “rewards” that force a PM to do 
everything within his power to see that his program doesn’t fail a test. If he fails a test, he 
may not have a program, because his program funding will be cut. Therefore, he doesn’t 
have a keen interest in failing as many times as is necessary to adequately “learn” from a 
developmental test. Maturing the technology through the test-fix-test process would 
ensure that his program will not have later technological setbacks that would in turn drive 
schedule and cost overruns, as well as increasing life-cycle support costs of the program. 
Nor does the PM welcome the tester, when he says, “I’m here to help you.”  The culture 
and reward system by which the PM lives dictates a different response.  As testimony to 
this, a GAO study found that the processes and culture within DoD have contributed to a 
feeling of great aversion by PMs, both towards the test community as well as towards the 
testing of the PMs’ weapon systems.  The GAO states the following:  
 
Testing plays a less constructive role in DoD because a failure in a key test 
can jeopardize program support. Specifically, test results often become 
directly linked to funding and other key decisions for programs. Such a 
role creates a more adversarial relationship between testers and program 
managers. [GAO, pg. 6, 31 July 2000]  
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The negative cultural pressures on a PM are further exemplified by an article in 
the Marine Corps Times, titled, “We Need to Lie -- To Save the Osprey, Squadron Boss 
Ordered Marines to Fake Records.” [Brinkley, pg.8, 29 January 2001]  This article 
alludes to the negative cultural pressures as perceived by the Marine PM, Lt. COL. Odin 
F. Liberman that forced him to lie to protect his program. The article was based upon an 
anonymous letter and audiotape received by the administrative offices of Navy Secretary 
Richard Danzig. The article quotes the barely audible audiotape of a voice identified as 
Liberman’s that states,  
 
The reason we need to lie is … [to] manipulate the data until Milestone III 
when the aircraft passes its final evaluation and enters full rate production, 
this program is in jeopardy … Everybody says readiness is in bad … It’s 
something that everybody is focused upon. 
[Brinkley, pgs 8 & 10, 29 January 2001] 
 
8. Army Definitions 
During the time of the Army audits cited below, the definition of the various 
classifications of what was known then as nondevelopmental items (which would be 
classified now as commercial items), is quoted as follows: 
 
• Basic. These are off-the-shelf items used in the same environment for 
which they were designed. The items should not require development or 
modification to be acceptable. Available information (such as test data, 
technical publications and reliability data) should be obtained from the 
item source and evaluated to avoid costly duplication of effort. 
• Adaptation. These are off-the-shelf items adapted for use in a different 
environment that they were designed for. The items require some 
modification for military use. Test and evaluation usually is required to 
ensure the modified items meet user requirements. 
• Integration.  These are nondevelopmental items used as subsystems or 
components of larger systems. The efforts require a prove-out phase 
involving systems engineering and test and evaluation to make sure the 
total system meets user requirements and is producible.  
[USAAA, pg. 8, 19 March 1990] 
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C.  COMMERCIAL ITEM USAGE ISSUES   
Issues will be presented by audit agency report or issue paper topic and then 
segregated into such areas as needs determination, acquisition strategy, market 
investigation, concept formulation, design, risk analysis, management of integration, test 
and evaluation, and logistics support. Logistics support will be further divided into the 
following areas: reliability, support requirements, and technical data for competitive 
reprocurement. 
1. U.S. Army Audit Agency, NE 90-206, Acquisition of 
Nondevelopmental Items: U.S. Army Natick Research, Developmental and 
Engineering Center, Natick, Massachusetts. 19 March 1990 
This audit reports that the Army often based acquisition strategies on incomplete 
information due to the fact that the Army did not properly conduct market investigations 
and concept formulation analysis.  
Some of the Army Audit Agency specific findings were as follows: “One system 
… involved system integration, but went from program initiation to production without 
sufficient testing.” [Pg 2] This resulted in an Army worldwide modular print system 
being purchased without sufficient required testing, which would have ensured that the 
system met Army requirements.  “Planned maintenance concept for an automatic reserve 
parachute ripcord release was inconsistent with requirements documents, and … did not 
tell decision makers the true cost or extent of required overhauls.” [pg. 2] 
a. Acquisition Strategy 
The Army Audit Agency reviewed 15 of 22 commercial item projects, and 
found that 14 of the 15 projects did not identify the Army identification category of 
commercial item (i.e., basic off-the-shelf, adaptation or integration item). For 10 of these 
projects, the strategy was inconsistent with the type of category of commercial item being 
acquired. For example, basic off-the-shelf items were managed as adaptation projects. In 
turn, adaptation and integration items were managed as other types of projects. For basic, 
low-risk, off-the-shelf projects, this added unnecessary delay. In addition, complex, high-
risk integration projects that should have been rigorously tested and evaluated were 
instead rushed into production as if they had been off-the-shelf projects. For example, as 
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the Army Audit Agency states  “One system -- the Modular Print System -- involved 
system integration, but went from program initiation to production without sufficient 
testing.” [pg. 2] This project was actually a complex system integration effort involving 
risks.  
These problems resulted from the erroneous supposition that by 
eliminating the necessary required analysis developers would be able to streamline the 
acquisition process.  As the Army Audit Agency report says, “Natick Center personnel 
did not appear to fully understand the various categories of commercial items and did not 
believe the category was important.” [pg. 11] 
b. Market Investigations 
The Army Audit Agency found that market investigations either were not 
conducted at all, or were inadequate for most of the commercial item projects. Army 
Audit Agency reviewed 15 of 22 commercial item projects, and found that five market 
investigations were not documented. Furthermore, for seven of the projects, the market 
investigations were neither complete, nor had been coordinated with the independent 
evaluators as required. The Natick RD&E Center’s policy at the time was to leave market 
investigations incomplete or undocumented in order to streamline the acquisition process, 
thereby saving time. However, without properly conducted market investigations, 
managers had little assurance that all the possible alternatives or material sources had 
been identified, investigated, and that the best alternative had been selected.  The Army 
Audit Agency said, “Natick Center often did not properly conduct market investigations 
and other required analyses to develop sound acquisition strategies for nondevelopmental 
items.” [pg. 2]  
For example, both snow and ice-traversing equipment and a field pack 
project experienced costly problems by not having a market investigation completed. In 
the case of the snow and ice-traversing equipment, if a proper market investigation had 
been performed, the problems with the selected off-the-shelf items could have been 
recognized and evaluated prior to acquiring and testing them. In the case of the field 
pack, a market investigation would have identified the deficiencies with the commercial 
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pack, which required modification to such an extent that it bore no resemblance to the 
original commercial pack.  
c. Concept Formulation 
The research center had not prepared concept formulation packages for 
any of the 15 projects reviewed, resulting in many questionable decisions. For example, 
the Army developed a saltwater purification device at a cost of $250,000 and a purchase 
cost of $1,320 each, when there was already a Navy-developed system available for a 
purchase cost of $980 each. A proper concept formulation package would have identified 
the Navy system as a possible alternative. A tradeoff analysis between cost and differing 
requirements could have resulted in selection of the Navy system as an alternative, thus 
saving the Army $250,000 in development costs as well as the extra $340 purchase cost 
per system. This selection would also have saved the Army the two years of 
developmental time needed to obtain the system.   
Another example, with no concept formulation package, is a five-soldier 
crew tent project, which resulted in five commercial tents being purchased and evaluated 
three times at a cost of $600,000. A proper concept formulation package, including 
tradeoff and other analyses, would have identified the most promising alternative for 
decision makers.  
2. U.S. Army Audit Agency, NE 91-204, Acquisition of 
Nondevelopmental Items. 17 June 1991 
The audit, among other findings, found that five separate Army commodity 
command groups managing 39 commercial item projects didn’t properly support 
acquisition strategies.  
a. Acquisition Strategy 
The analysis to support the selection of commercial items, which is 
necessary at the beginning of a project, was not performed. As the Army Audit Agency 
found, “DA (Department of the Army) sometimes directed developers to use 
nondevelopmental items, and managers therefore believed there was no real need to 
perform the comprehensive, upfront analysis required to support their strategies.” [pg. 19] 
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b. Market Investigations 
Market investigations were not documented for 11 of the 39 projects. Of 
the remaining 28 projects, a total of 21 had incomplete documentation. As the Army 
Audit Agency noted, “The investigations didn’t adequately support the streamlining 
actions managers took—particularly the elimination of a development or prototype phase 
before production … As a result, the development effort required to adapt or integrate 
these items had to occur during production.” [pg. 25] 
c. Concept Formulation  
Of 29 projects reviewed for a complete concept formulation package, none 
supported this concept formulation characteristic. The majority, 22 projects, didn’t have 
any of the concept package completed. For the 7 projects, only the portion of the concept 
formulation package that dealt with cost and operational effectiveness was complete.  
d. Management of Integration 
As the Army Audit Agency stated in this report regarding integration 
efforts, “Such efforts not only require research and development, but may need to 
undergo both a demonstration and full-scale development phase unless risk is determined 
to be sufficiently low.” [pg. 28]  Eight of the Army potentially high-risk integration 
projects, totaling $1.7 billion, didn’t have a research and development (R&D) phase prior 
to production. Although utilizing commercial item off-the-shelf components, the systems 
were high-risk integration projects for which the Army had documented only minimal 
information to show that the projects would meet user requirements after integration was 
accomplished. 
e. Logistics Support 
The Army Audit Agency reviewed 39 commercial item projects for which 
logistics support costs had been projected at $24 billion. These projects had critical issues 
related to logistics support, which hadn’t been addressed early enough in the acquisition 
process.  Three of these issues are as follows: reliability, support requirements, and 
technical data for competitive reprocurement.   
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(1) Reliability. The Army Audit Agency reviewed 39 
commercial item programs, many with major deficiencies.  They found that 11 of these 
projects had no quantitative reliability requirements established. In 13 of the projects, 
reliability had not been adequately addressed during market investigations. In several 
cases, contractors’ reliability estimates had been received without the performance data, 
which is necessary in order to evaluate the contractor reliability claims. In 15 of the 
reviewed projects, the Army Audit Agency found that material developers hadn’t 
adequately conducted reliability testing prior to award of the production contract. It was 
found that systems were fielded that had subsequent reliability problems, which could 
affect system readiness and significantly increase costs. As the Army Audit Agency said, 
“The failure to adequately address reliability early in the acquisition process for new 
programs significantly increases the risks associated with using nondevelopmental items 
to satisfy Army requirements.” [pg. 40] 
(2) Support Requirements.  Many of the 39 projects 
reviewed had no reliability testing, which would have reduced the risk of critical 
decisions about logistics support. In all cases, the most expeditious means available were 
used to establish the logistic support plans, which were not necessarily the best or most 
cost-effective decisions for the Army.  
(3) Technical Data for Competitive Reprocurement. For 14 
of the 39 projects reviewed, data adequate for reprocurement was not acquired. 
Consequently, the Army will have to use the sole source vendor for any reprocurement of 
spare parts or systems throughout their complete lifespan. Some managers assessed the 
availability of data suitable for competitive reprocurement in their market analysis. But 
many other market investigations either were not documented, or the availability of 
technical data was not addressed during the market investigations. Some managers used 
lifetime contractor support, not having considered technical reprocurement data as 
necessary. Others decided that data necessary for reprocurement was too expensive. In 
most cases, managers didn’t use economic analysis or any other proper analytical 
technique prior to their decision.  It was determined by the Army Audit Agency that 
several projects would have benefited from obtaining technical data suitable for 
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competitive reprocurement.  Those programs either had to acquire replenishment spares 
at significantly higher prices (Lightweight Digital Facsimile), or had to find a 
replacement unit because spares and contractor support could not be obtained (Basic 
Generation Unit used in the Battlefield Electronics Communication System). [pgs. 44-45] 
3. U.S. Army Audit Agency, NE 90-209, Acquisition of 
Nondevelopmental Items: Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. 11 September 1990 
This audit found that the Army advocate for commercial items had not been 
involved enough to make sure that program managers considered the commercial item 
approach. Furthermore, it was discovered that the advocates were not adequately 
monitoring commercial item projects to document “lessons learned,” or to make sure that 
the two main objectives of commercial items were achieved: the reduction of program 
cost and acquisition time. Also, market investigations and concept formulation analyses 
either were not conducted at all or were improperly conducted, and project 
documentation was either lax or nonexistent. Complex integration projects were awarded 
without adequate testing to assure that they were operationally suitable and that they met 
the Army requirements.  Support concepts were not adequately investigated or justified to 
demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of the selected support concept during daily use, 
especially under wartime conditions.  
a. Acquisition Strategy 
Key phases and critical steps of the acquisition process were eliminated 
without explanation for all of the 15 commercial item projects reviewed. Thus, 
acquisition strategies that were followed were not adequately supported by analysis. As a 
result, managers often followed inappropriate strategies for the category of commercial 
item acquired. For example, complex commercial items requiring integration were 
frequently acquired with a strategy more appropriate for low-risk, off-the-shelf items. 
Seven complex commercial item projects went into production without a separate R&D 
phase to obtain and evaluate prototypes. When any phase of the acquisition process is 
eliminated or combined, Army regulation requires that the material developer justify their 
decision in the acquisition strategy.  Most of the strategies reviewed simply stated that the 
commercial item approach chosen eliminated the need for research and development.  
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b. Market Investigations 
Market investigations were not documented for five of the 15 commercial 
item projects reviewed. There was documentation to show that market investigations had 
been started for 10 of the 15 projects; however, they were incomplete and unacceptable 
for decision-making purposes. In some cases, PMs cited “urgent requirement” as the 
reason for inadequate market investigation. However, even follow-on contract options 
were awarded without justification for not having a market investigation. 
c. Concept Formulation 
The concept formulation process was not completed for any of the 15 
projects reviewed. The acquisition strategies did not address this key step, nor did they 
explain why the required concept formulation process was not performed. The Army 
Audit Agency found that PMs felt that since they had been directed to use commercial 
items by higher management, there was neither a need nor a requirement for the concept 
formulation phase.  
d. Test and Evaluation 
Production contracts for 12 of the 15 projects were begun without 
independent test and evaluation to determine whether the items met Army requirements. 
These contracts were initiated in spite of the fact that all categories of commercial items 
are required to undergo operational test and evaluation (OT&E) before production, unless 
an independent market investigation report concludes that such testing can be reduced or 
eliminated. 
During a review of 15 commercial item projects, the Army Audit Agency 
also found that 11 items did not have OT performed. As the Army Audit Agency says, 
“In total, about $1.8 billion was spent acquiring nondevelopmental items without 
adequately showing the suitability of the items in a realistic operating environment.”   
[pg. 31] 
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e. Logistics Support 
An Army Audit Agency review of ten commercial item projects, with 
estimated LCC support costs of $24 billion, had no analysis performed that justified the 
logistics support concept selected. 
In the AN/PRC-127 Radio, for example, the determination was made to 
use a throwaway repair concept to support the radio’s receiver-transmitter after the 
manufacturer’s warranty expired. A maintenance cost-effectiveness analysis performed 
prior to contract award concluded that repair costs were about the same as replacement 
costs, hence the throwaway decision. However, when the contract was awarded, the 
actual unit price was much higher than maintaining the receiver-transmitter would have 
been. Nonetheless, the support concept was not reevaluated.  
(1) Reliability. The Army Audit Agency reviewed seven 
commercial item projects for their reliability. They found that the material developers did 
not ensure that qualitative reliability requirements were documented during the concept 
exploration phase, prior to awarding the production contracts. Three of the commercial 
item programs’ requirements were not established at all. In the other four programs, 
managers used the contractor’s predicted values for the quantitative requirements, which 
were basically technical estimates and not based on analysis of the item’s operating 
mission. 
(2)  Supportability.  An Army Audit Agency review of ten 
commercial item projects with estimated life cycle support costs of $24 billion had no 
analysis performed that justified the logistics support concept selected. Logistics support 
plans were usually prepared, but there was no analysis to justify those plans or to 
demonstrate cost-effectiveness of the support concepts. In most cases, the end-item 
contractor was to provide maintenance and supply support for the life expectancy of most 
items.  However, there was no analysis performed that showed that contractor support 
was more cost effective than using the Army’s organic support system. For example, as 
the Army Audit Agency indicated, “Program plans did not ensure that spare parts for the 
AN/PRC-126 Small Unit Radio would be available at fair and reasonable prices.” [pg. 5] 
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4. Bonheim, Mike LTC, PM – Physical Security Equipment (PSE), 
Commercial Items Acquisition Data Call, 22 February 2001 
PM-PSE acts as the PSE focal point for the Army and other Services. The DoD 
Physical Security Equipment Action Group has created a Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
working group to identify commercial physical security and force protection equipment 
that can immediately be used to solve terrorism deficiencies. Under the Chairman Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 5261.01A, commanders are provided funds to react as 
follows:  “The fund provides a means for CINCs to react to unanticipated requirements 
from changes in terrorist threat level or force protection doctrine/ standards.” [CJCS, pg. 
1]   
Therefore, as the PSE focal point, PM-PSE has been involved in commercial item 
security equipment projects, identifying several problems as follows: 
a.  Needs Determination 
A variety of Government users are involved in the purchase of security 
equipment. For the most part these users have no experience or training in the acquisition 
process.  This results in difficulty in obtaining a user statement of work that accurately 
identifies what they need or want the product to do.  
b. Reliability 
There may be a multitude of buyers from different commands for the 
security equipment, each having their own certification requirements. Consequently, a 
vendor will not be able to certify the product for all scenarios.  
Also, the vendors’ performance claims have proven inaccurate. As PM-
PSE states, “In cases involving two portable barriers both barriers failed the initial crash 
test and had to be reconfigured by the manufacturer before a successful test could be 
accomplished.” [Bonhiem, pg. 2] 
 c. Market Investigations 
There has been no centralized database established for equipment that has 
been purchased as well as the results of their operational use or testing. 
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d. Logistics Support 
There are no durability or lifespan indicators for these physical security 
commercial items. Repair procedures are nonexistent. PM-PSE states, “In many cases, 
detailed repair documentation is not available.  If the item fails it must be scrapped or 
returned to the factory for repair - a much more difficult task in deployed units than the 
civilian world.” [Bonhiem, pg 2]    Determining the quantity and type of spare parts is an 
issue. As PM-PSE indicates, “Determining the amount of repair and spare parts and 
where there are stored and subsequently issued needs to be determined.” [Bonhiem, pg. 
2]     
e. Test and Evaluation 
There may be a multitude of buyers from different commands for the 
security equipment, each with their own testing requirements. Consequently, a vendor 
will not be able to test or certify the product for all scenarios. 
5. GAO/NSIAD-95-161, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES: Maneuver 
System Schedule Includes Unnecessary Risk, 15 September 1995 
The GAO states that because of premature entry into production, two previous 
UAV programs suffered from costly redesigns in order to achieve acceptable system 
performance.  The two previous nondevelopmental UAV systems, the Pioneer and the 
Hunter, were both started into production without being subjected to any operational 
testing.  
Premature production of the Pioneer resulted in doubling the costs for nine 
systems that did not meet the operational requirements of the user. As of the writing of 
this GAO report, the Hunter system was also experiencing problems and an uncertain 
future after an expenditure of $627 million.  
Because of the previous dubious acquisition track record, the GAO issued this 
interim report to bring attention to inadequate testing aspects of the program that, it was 
believed, would unnecessarily increase DoD’s program risk.   
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Test and Evaluation 
This report states that the Joint Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles project 
office planned to begin production of the Maneuver System before making sure that the 
system could meet operational requirements via operational testing prior to, or during, 
low rate initial production (LRIP). Test articles are normally obtained from LRIP; 
however, in this case there was no testing of the LRIP vehicles planned by the project 
office. 
6. GAO/NSIAD-96-2, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not 
Appropriate for Navy Fleet Use, 1 December 1995 
The GAO reviewed a variant of the $4.2 billion joint UAV program planned for 
use on Navy amphibious assault ships to provide reconnaissance, target acquisition, and 
other military missions. 
Needs Determination 
The GAO finding was that, “The Joint Tactical UAV Projects Office is 
proceeding with the acquisition of the Hunter shipboard variant even though all Navy 
fleet commanders have stated that they do not want the system on Navy ships.” [Pg 1] 
The fleet commanders opposed the Hunter UAV because of the adverse impact it would 
have had on all other flight operations from their ships, and because its performance 
capability was inadequate for their needs. 
Despite fleet concerns, the Chief of Naval Operations planned to proceed 
with procurement of the shipboard variant. 
7. The DoD IG Report 96-111, Allegations Involving the Procurement of 
the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-Short-Range System, 7 May 1996 
From 1990 to 1996 the GAO issued six negative reports concerning the Hunter 
UAV Short Range program system deficiencies, some of which are documented above. 
The first report in September 1990 indicated that the Navy’s testing strategy for the UAV 
would not be in a realistic operational environment, and that full-rate production would 
begin prior to the system meeting the Navy’s requirements.  The September 1992 report 
indicates that adequate user tests were not performed in a realistic operational 
environment to assure that critical system performance capabilities satisfactorily existed. 
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The December 1993 report indicates that the system didn’t meet milestone criteria for 
entry into LRIP, and that testing had not been done to ensure that operational 
requirements were met. The June 1995 report states that the system was logistically 
unsupportable, and that tests identified serious performance problems. The September 
1995 report states that the acquisition demonstrates the adverse consequences of initiating 
production without first obtaining adequate assurance of satisfactory system performance.  
This last report of May 1996 states that: “The audit partially or fully substantiated the 
allegations that the LRIP system did not conform to contract requirements, operator 
safety was at risk, reliability was inadequate and the system was never subjected to 
operational testing.” [pg. 1]  
In January 1996, the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) terminated any future 
Hunter system acquisitions. 
a. Needs Determination 
The Hunter system requirements were not met. As the DoD IG report 
states, “The Government bought the first of the seven LRIP systems knowing major 
performance deficiencies existed that made the system clearly fall short of contractually 
defined requirements. The system has numerous hardware shortages that history shows 
that the contractor will never satisfy.” [pg. 4] It can be seen that the PMO staunchly 
supported the program as demonstrated by the fact that the Government contracting 
officer issued 34 waivers to prevent program delays due to specification 
nonconformance. The Hunter Project Office also approved 257 engineering design 
changes and 125 specification changes to resolve inconsistencies. 
b. Reliability 
The DoD IG found that the Hunter Unmanned Vehicle LRIP did not have 
adequate reliability. As the DoD IG report stated, “The Hunter system did not meet five 
of nine contractual requirements for reliability, availability, maintainability, and built-in-
test.” [pg. 7] Soldiers and military instructors using the system also said that it was 
unreliable. The Project Office continued to support the program, indicating that “test 
results may not reflect the system’s long-term averages for the time to repair.” [pg. 8] 
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c. Test and Evaluation 
The DoD IG found that the Hunter Unmanned Vehicle LRIP was not 
subjected to realistic operational testing. The Project Office subjected the prototypes to 
limited user tests, but never performed any operational testing on the LRIP systems. The 
DoD IG stated, 
The technical tests were done in a controlled, sterile environment and any 
advertised results were not representative of the system’s true capabilities 
and real limitations. The system was never subjected to test scenarios that 
replicated the true conditions the hardware would encounter. Credible 
operational tests have never been accomplished. [pg. 9] 
 
8. DoD IG Report 95-193, DoD Hotline Allegations Regarding the Naval 
Special Warfare Patrol Coastal Ship and the Rigid Inflatable Boat Acquisition 
Programs, 15 May 1995 
At the start of the coastal ship portion of this program, the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) was considering three alternative approaches: a commercial item 
approach using existing patrol craft technology, modification of an existing 110-foot 
patrol craft, and new development. The CNO rejected new development due to cost and 
time constraints. The modification approach was also rejected, since the 110-foot craft 
did not meet all the operational performance requirements. Finally, the CNO approved a 
Non-Acquisition Program Definition Document, which “defines and gives direction to 
Advanced and Engineering Development programs that explore technologies or integrate 
systems not directly related to a procurement.” [pg. 7] The Non-Acquisition Program 
Definition Document determined that, “The boat’s performance and configuration 
requirements were to be determined based on existing craft in the commercial 
marketplace.” [pg. 7]  
Thus, it was determined without further review that a commercial item program 
would be selected.  A firm-fixed price contract was awarded for 13 patrol craft using the 
commercial item approach. Over a year later, the Supervisor of Shipbuilding imposed 
General Ships Specifications (GSS) requirements on the patrol craft contractor. This 
caused the program to evolve from commercial item to a developmental acquisition 
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program. The GSS requirements change contributed to greater than 40 percent cost 
growth within the program. 
Similarly, the Rigid Inflatable Boat (RIB) program evaluated four boats as 
commercial item candidates. None of the boats met operational requirements. After the 
evaluation, the PM for Support Ships, Boats, and Crafts directed the Naval Surface 
Warfare Center (NSWC), “to develop a technical data package for a 33 foot (10-meter) 
RIB.” [pg. 8] This directive effectively changed the program from a commercial item 
program to a developmental acquisition program. 
The DoD IG found that the Navy deviated from the commercial item acquisition 
approach in both cases, without conducting the necessary risk analyses to support the 
decision. The Navy had modified the ship requirements beyond the point at which a 
commercial item could satisfy them, and then awarded a firm-fixed price contract for the 
boat without adequate risk analyses to support the decision. 
a. Needs Determination 
In the coastal ship program, the Navy combined requirements, which led 
to the need for a larger platform. There was no detailed requirements review with the 
program sponsor or operators. The increased requirements necessitated changes beyond 
which a commercial item acquisition approach could prove satisfactory. 
In the RIB program, the requirements within the Operational 
Requirements Document (ORD) were more restrictive than those within the Non-
Acquisition Program Definition Document. This should have caused the Naval Special 
Warfare Rigid Inflatable Boat program office to determine areas in which requirements 
could have been compromised without loss of mission effectiveness. 
b. Design 
Specifications for the RIB were based on commercial item subsystems and 
components. However, their integration into a functioning boat exceeded the design and 
performance capabilities of existing vessels. 
The RIB design process was accelerated by the RIB PM from 28 weeks to 
13 weeks, but no time was allowed to assess or minimize the risk that this created in the 
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acquisition process.  It was later determined by the Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NSSC) that the design should not have been accelerated.  
c. Risk Analysis 
The NSCC did not perform an adequate risk analysis that would have 
revealed the high technical risk caused by the failure of commercial vessels to meet both 
the ORD and the greatly compressed acquisition schedule. 
 d.  Test and Evaluation 
There was no first article contract for the LRIP of a limited number of 
boats prior to full-rate production for testing purposes. Limiting the initial production 
contract to the first two boats for test purposes would have minimized the production risk 
for the remaining boats. Because there was no first article test contract for the LRIP of a 
limited number of boats prior to full rate production, there was no operational testing, 
either. Eliminating testing increased the production risk that boats would not meet user 
operational requirements, and would then have to be modified later at greater expense 
and time.  
D. COMMERCIAL ITEMS PROBLEMS, ISSUES AND CONSEQUENCES 
SUMMARY 
The table below summarizes the problems/issues from this chapter as a “risk”, 
and the “potential consequence” of the unresolved risk. 
 
Table 1 Commercial Item Consequence Matrix  
   
 
         RISK                   POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCE 
                        
Needs Determination 
-   User requirements improperly 
identified or misunderstood 
 
-  Requirements allowed to grow; i.e., 
requirements are gold plated. 
 
-  Need unsatisfied; wrong product produced 
and purchased; resources wasted; possible 
program elimination. 
- “Best value” solution will not be produced; 
impacts to cost, schedule, technical 




 Table 1 (continued) Commercial Item Consequence Matrix 
 
         RISK                   POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCE 
 
Acquisition Strategy 
- Incorrect streamlining acquisition 
strategy used. 
 
- Items procured without key acquisition 
phases complete; impacts to program cost, 
schedule and technical performance; DoD 
resources wasted. 
Market Investigations 
- Inadequate or no market 
investigation performed. 
 
- Wrong item procured, “best value” item not 
procured, impact to cost, schedule and 
technical performance, DoD resources wasted. 
Concept Formulation 
-  Inadequate or no concept 
formulation package prepared. 
 
-  Best technical solution not selected; impact 
to cost, and schedule, DoD resources wasted. 
Risk Analysis 
- A risk analysis was not performed 
 
- Impact to cost, schedule and technical 
performance; DoD resources wasted; the 
program may be eliminated. 
Manage Integration 
- Inaccurate assessment of program 
integration risk. 
 
- R&D, or T&E not performed; impact to cost, 
schedule and technical performance; DoD 
resources wasted; the program may be 
eliminated. 
Test & Evaluation 
- Testing was inadequate or was not 
performed. 
- Best technical solution not developed; 
performance, reliability & maintainability 
goals not met; impacts to total LCC; 
operational effectiveness & suitability not 
proven; impacts to program cost, schedule, and 
technical performance; potential mission 
failure; DoD resources wasted. 
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Table 1 (continued) C ommercial Item Consequence Matrix   
 
 
         RISK                   POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCE                        
 
Reliability 
- The program reliability was 
inadequate. 
 
- No quantitative reliability 
requirements established. 
 
- Contractor’s reliability estimates not 
verified. 
 






- RAM is adversely impacted; program’s total 
LCC is adversely impacted; potential mission 








- Inadequate logistics support is 
planned. 
 
- Inability to support the system during a 
wartime environment; mission failure; 
program’s total LCC is adversely impacted; 
DoD resources are wasted.                   
- Sub optimal logistics support, increased 
system LCC, DoD resources wasted.  
Tech Data - Competitive 
Reprocurement 
- Data adequate for reprocurement is 
not obtained. 
 
- A sole source vendor must be used; 
reprocurement costs are increased; an inability 
to obtain parts; potential mission failure; DoD 
resources are wasted. 
 
Design 
- The design was underestimated. 
 
 
- The design process was incorrectly 
accelerated. 
 
- The best design will not be completed; 
impacts to program cost, schedule and 
technical performance. 
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In this analysis chapter, all of the possible causes, as well as the underlying 
known causes, of the problems and issues in the previous chapter will be presented and 
analyzed. It is important to determine the potential critical causes of the problems and 
issues in order to arrive at a corrective action, or “best practice,” and thus to provide a 
template which PMs can use to preclude similar occurrences in the future. 
The analysis will be presented as an array, in the same manner as it was in the 
previous chapter. A statement of each issue from the previous chapter will be followed by 
examples to demonstrate some of the known causes of that particular issue. At the end of 
this chapter is a table summarizing all the known and potential causes, which have been 
identified from the reports that were the basis of this research, as cited in Chapter III. 
B.  ROOT CAUSE PROBLEMS AND ISSUES 
For the issues cited below in paragraph C, there are several recurring causes that 
underlie nearly every issue. These causes can be called “root causes,” because they 
appear to be at the terminus, root, or bottom of the explanation for many of the issues. 
Several root causes have been identified, as follows:  
1. Inadequate Education or Training within the Acquisition Community  
This can always be used as an excuse for errors in judgment. Because their 
leadership has told acquisition personnel that they must use commercial items, they 
consider this edict as justification for the elimination of critical steps in the acquisition 
process when acquiring commercial items. Without the knowledge (that education or 
training would give them) of the intricacies or difficulties of each critical part of the 
acquisition process, acquisition personnel may not understand that the process cannot be 
abbreviated or eliminated without adequate investigation and justification. Consequently, 
they suffer the risk of making a disastrously poor decision.  
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 Because commercial item usage is fairly new, there are many gray areas with 
respect to its correct usage in the acquisition process. Incorrect usage happens frequently 
enough to make training and education an important issue.  
2. Inadequate Use of Lessons Learned  
In several cases previously cited, errors noted in audit reports were repeated. This 
indicates a serious failure to learn from previous mistakes. The commercial item advocate 
for the Army was supposed to accumulate lessons learned, but failed to do so. Within the 
various Army Audit Agency reports, similar errors occurred time after time, indicating 
that lessons learned are not being applied to new Army acquisition situations.  
LTC Michael Bonheim indicated in his paper that in the area of market 
investigations, there is no centralized database for the accumulation of lessons learned.  
3. Incorrect Culture-Driven Decision Making  
At the root of many poor decisions within the acquisition corps seems to be the 
“culture” that drives the decision. That is, the decision is a foregone conclusion, given the 
structure and forces that impinge upon the PM during his decision-making process, as 
previously noted in Chapter III. This area needs to be researched in greater depth. 
C. ANALYSIS OF PROCESS PROBLEMS AND ISSUES  
Noted below are examples that highlight the major causes of the issues identified 
in commercial item usage. 
1. Needs Determination 
Issue: Needs or user requirements have been improperly identified, 
misunderstood, or ignored.   
The Navy coastal ship program started with a requirement to use a non-
acquisition approach to “base the acquisition on existing craft in the commercial 
marketplace.” [DoD IG, pg. 7, 15 May 95]  Because General Ships Specifications 
(military specifications) were imposed on the contractor one year later, the subsequent 
acquisition decision changed from the original goal of procuring a commercial vessel to 
that of procuring a vessel specifically designed to comply with military specifications. 
This decision was made without either risk analysis or cost analysis to support the 
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decision. Certainly, the typical acquisition process was not followed in this case. The 
causes of this procedural omission could have been any of the following: inadequate 
acquisition education or training, cultural issues that stressed speed, or cutting corners 
and costs at the expense of the accurate performance of the acquisition process. Another 
potential cause of this procedural omission could have been the powerful influence that 
culture has upon the way we perform and operate. The PM’s culture is one that is cost, 
schedule, and funding driven, each of these being success oriented - sometimes 
constraining or preventing performance of the very activities that would keep the PM out 
of difficulty.  
In the Navy UAV case, the Project Office blatantly ignored the fleet commanders’ 
dissatisfaction with the Hunter UAV. The causes here could have been many, such as not 
having a clearly written ORD that would have identified the need to minimize 
interference with existing onboard flight operations, inadequate use of IPT’s in the 
acquisition process that should have included the warfighter as a team member, 
inadequate training or education of the Projects Office personnel, or a culture-driven 
decision by the PM to ignore the warfighter in the interest of swift project completion. 
In the PM-PSE case, a variety of users had differing requirements, but no 
experience or training in defining these requirements. The varied causes identified here 
are as follows: inadequate teaming between user and PM, inadequate training and/or 
education of the user in the acquisition process, lack of standardization of the security 
equipment, lack of a centralized force protection database, and failure of the users to be 
flexible enough to consider modifying their requirements in order to more easily utilize 
commercial force protection items.   
Issue: Requirements were allowed to change or grow, i.e., requirements were 
“gold plated.”   
In the coastal ship program, the Navy’s requirements creep was due in large part 
to combining requirements, which led in turn to the need for a larger platform, causing 
the length of the vessel to grow from 110’ to 170’ in length. This was probably caused by 
not having a detailed requirements review with the program sponsor or operators, as was 
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mentioned in the audit. In other words, there was no IPT, and therefore, no coordination 
among the stakeholders, as would have occurred had there been an IPT. An IPT would 
have incorporated the teaming tenets of cooperation, coordination, consensus, and 
decision streamlining. Additional causal contributors were lack of a clearly written ORD, 
lack of adequate acquisition planning, and inadequate market research in the beginning 
phase of the program.  
2. Market Investigation 
Issue:  There were inadequate or no market investigations performed. 
At the Natick RD&E Center, there was a policy to leave market investigations 
either incomplete or undocumented, in order to “streamline” or speed up the process. 
This was done without apparent concern for, or knowledge of, the negative impact that 
inadequate market investigations would have on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
material selection process. This exemplifies either culturally influenced decision-making 
in order to incorrectly “streamline” the process to save time and money, or inadequate 
training and/or education in preparation for the acquisition process, which would have 
enabled those involved to make the correct decisions from the result of their market 
investigations. Another alternative is that organizations might have known the right thing 
to do, but were so resource constrained that they couldn’t get the documentation done. 
The lack of a database for market investigations was documented by PM-PSE, 
LTC Bonheim, and was also an issue in Dr. Gansler’s USD(AT&L) memorandum of 
January 5 2001, which is quoted as follows: 
To help overcome these barriers to accessing commercial items, I am 
taking the following actions: … Requesting that the IPT determine the 
feasibility of establishing a pilot program so that the Services and 
Agencies may collect market research and Commercial Item 
Determinations in a central database, or developing tools to assist in 
ensuring commercial item determinations are reasonably consistent. I 
request that the recommendation regarding this action be presented to 
DUSD (AR) within 90 days of the date of this memorandum.  [DoD. 
USD(AT&L), 5 January 2001] 
This suggests an awareness within the acquisition community that there 
are “issues” related to ease of access to both commercial item information as well 
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as usage data within the acquisition community, which, if readily available, might 
make the process more efficient. This commercial item market database could 
also capture the valuable lessons learned, which seem to be lost to successive 
generations of acquisition members. 
3. Concept Formulation 
Issue:  There were inadequate or no concept formulation packages prepared. 
Examples demonstrating this issue are to be seen in the 19 March 1990 Army 
Audit Agency report. This report is about Natick RD&E Center’s lack of preparation of 
the concept formulation packages for two projects, which resulted in increasing costs and 
schedules for both projects. One example is the saltwater purification project, for which a 
tradeoff analysis would have identified the Naval system as a potential alternative, thus 
providing great time and cost savings for the Army project. The second example is the 
case of the five-soldier crew tent project, where a concept formulation package with its 
tradeoff analysis would have eliminated the need to test five tents, three times each.   
4. Risk Analysis 
Issue:  A risk analysis was not performed. 
The decision to eliminate risk analysis in the Navy’s coastal ship program can be 
attributed to lack of training, lack of education, or lack of attention to lessons learned in 
the acquisition process; alternatively, it might have been culture-driven in the mistaken 
premise that time would be saved if this step in the process were eliminated. Although 
there is a Systems Acquisition Management curriculum (816) taught at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Naval officers are not enrolled. This is due to the fact that a military 
specialty code for Systems Acquisition Management does not exist for Naval officers. 
Consequently, the lack of specific training or education in the acquisition field is 
understandable as a potential cause for the elimination of risk analysis in their acquisition 
process. 
5. Acquisition Strategy  
Issue: The acquisition process was incorrectly streamlined, resulting in the use 
of an incorrect acquisition strategy. 
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In all of the U.S. Army Audit Agency reports, incorrect acquisition strategy was a 
significant finding.  
In the Natick Center report of 19 March 1990, the strategies were inconsistent 
with the categories of commercial items being used. This is an indication of either 
inadequate training or lack of education in the acquisition process, crucial for the 
identification of each acquisition category (i.e., commercial item, modified commercial 
item, nondevelopmental item, or developmental item); or the premeditated incorrect 
streamlining of the process to save money and time for culture-driven reasons.  
In the 11 September 1990 U.S. Army Audit Agency report, key phases and 
critical steps of the acquisition process were eliminated without explanation or 
justification. This is an indication of either a lack of training and/or education regarding 
the importance and necessity of each part of the acquisition process, or culture-driven 
poor decisions in order to save the program time and/or money. 
In the 17 June 1991 report of the U.S. Army Audit Agency, the incorrect 
acquisition strategy was used because, as the five agencies audited in this report told the 
Army Audit Agency, they were directed to use commercial items, and therefore believed 
this relieved them of performing the necessary analysis to determine and support strategy 
decisions. This is an indication of lack of training and/or education concerning the 
importance and necessity for each part of the acquisition process. It is also an example of 
how important “culture” is in decision making. The fact that agencies are told to do 
something does not relieve them of the responsibility to “think,” and thus make well-
chosen decisions instead of poor ones. 
6. Design 
Issue: The design was underestimated. 
The design issue, exemplified by the Coastal Ship project, can be attributed to 
inadequate training or education on the part of the Navy design estimation process when 
utilizing commercial items; or it could have been caused by a culture-driven need to 
reduce the time and/or cost of the acquisition.   
Issue: The design process was incorrectly accelerated. 
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As an example of this issue, the PM accelerated the Rigid Inflatable Boat (RIB) 
design process from 28 weeks to 13 weeks without any analysis given to the risk or 
consequences of doing so. The clear goal of the PM was to reduce the time required of 
the project’s design task. This issue could be attributed to inadequate training or 
education on the part of the Navy concerning the use of risk analysis in the acquisition 
process; or it could have been caused by the culture-driven need of the PM to reduce the 
schedule and/or cost of the program.   
7. Management of Integration   
Issue:  Integration projects associated with high risk for a program were not 
managed properly. 
An example of this issue was published in the U.S. Army Audit Agency’s 17 June 
1991 report, where it was noted that there were four complex commercial item 
integration projects for a total cost of $1.7 billion, none of which had a testing phase prior 
to awarding their production contract. The commercial items were all off-the-shelf 
components. However, the integrated systems were not off-the-shelf and were highly 
complex as well. For these four projects, there was little or no information to prove that 
the integrated systems would successfully work together to meet the Army’s 
requirements. The failure to manage the integration of commercial items within a 
program can be attributed to either lack of training and/or education, or a culture-driven 
desire to reduce the time and/or cost of the program. 
8.  Test and Evaluation 
Issue:  There was inadequate testing or no testing performed. 
An example of this issue is the U.S. Army Audit Agency 11 September 1990 
report on the $643 million Regency Net project, which involved a mix of commercial as 
well as previously developed military items, all of which had to be integrated via 
complex software development. This project included both a basic contract as well as 
four production options. It was awarded at a cost of $300 million before any prototypes 
were tested. Another project from the Army Audit Agency 11 September 1990 report on 
Mobile Subscriber Equipment again involved integration of commercial items with 
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previously developed military items, as well as the development of complex software. It 
was not tested until $1.3 billion of the basic production contract had been obligated, 
along with two production options. The rationale given to the Army Audit Agency was as 
follows: “Acquisition strategies for the projects stated that extensive testing was not 
needed because a nondevelopmental item approach was used or that a contractor 
demonstrated the item before the production contracts were awarded.” [U.S. Army Audit 
Agency, pg 21, 11 September 1990]  However, the contractor demonstrations did not 
provide sufficient evidence that the items had met the Army operational requirements. 
The failure to properly test and evaluate commercial items within a program can be 
attributed to lack of training or education, or can be caused by a culture-driven need on 
the part of the PM to reduce the time and/or cost of the program by eliminating or 
reducing testing.  
9. Logistics Support  
a. Reliability 
Issue: The program reliability was inadequate. 
An example of this issue is the PM-PSE paper, which indicated that 
vendor claims proved inaccurate. This can be traced to either inadequate early testing of 
the products or inadequate training and/or education concerning the need for adequate 
evaluation and testing of a commercial item in order to confirm the vendor’s reliability 
claims. 
Another example of inadequate program reliability is the DoD IG report of 
7 May 1996, which showed that the Hunter UAV program continued to receive PM 
support even though it did not have adequate reliability. This can be attributed to the 
PM’s culture-driven syndrome to protect his program at all costs, in this case by avoiding 
early testing that might have demonstrated reliability flaws, resulting in a program 
funding cut and, ultimately, delays or even termination of the program. 
The primary cause of inadequate reliability can be traced to inadequate 
testing early in the program.  A major reason for inadequate testing is often the cultural 
aversion on the part of the PM to both testing and testers, as previously mentioned in 
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Chapter III, section B-7. Another potential cause, as noted above, is inadequate training 
and/or education regarding the importance of attaining adequate system reliability. 
Issue:  No quantitative reliability requirements established. 
This issue is exemplified by the U.S. Army Audit Agency reports of 11 
September 1990 and 17 June 1991, which both state that many projects had no 
quantitative reliability requirements established. In the absence of reliability 
requirements, there is no basis upon which to perform confirmatory tests. However, in 
some cases, with or without a reliability requirement, contractor reliability estimates were 
verified, but not early enough to allow time for corrective action. In other cases, 
reliability testing was not conducted at all.  
The cause for not establishing reliability requirements could be one or 
more of the following: PMs having been culture-driven to save the program time and/or 
money; lack of training/education which enabled the mistaken belief that management’s 
edict to use commercial items voids the need for establishing reliability of commercial 
items; or the lack of training and/or education of users and PMs regarding the importance 
of establishing reliability requirements, especially for commercial items. 
Issue:  Contractor’s reliability estimates not verified. 
This issue is displayed in the U.S. Army Audit Agency reports of 11 
September 1990 and 17 June 1991. In both reports, vendors’ reliability estimates were 
not verified in the operating environment. In several cases, reliability estimates had been 
received, but without the performance data necessary in order to evaluate the contractor 
claims. In four programs, the contractor’s predicted values for the quantitative 
requirements were used, but not verified. These contractor-predicted values were 
basically technical estimates; they were not based on any real data or analyses and 
certainly did not reflect the operating environment and conditions where military systems 
must perform.  
The reasons for not verifying a contractor’s reliability estimates are 
attributable to one or all of the following: lack of training and/or education concerning 
the importance of commercial item reliability verification through testing; culture-driven 
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decision-making to save the program time and money by eliminating or reducing testing; 
or lack of training/education enabling the mistaken belief that management’s edict to use 
commercial items voids the need for verifying the reliability of commercial items.  
Issue:  Inadequate reliability testing prior to contract award. 
This issue is exemplified by the U.S. Army Audit Agency 17 June 1991 
report, as well as both the DoD IG reports of 15 May 1995 and 7 May 1996. They all 
stated that many projects had no or inadequate reliability testing prior to contract award. 
In the case of the Hunter UAV, inadequate reliability, among other issues, killed the 
program. 
Inadequate reliability testing can be attributed to a lack of training and/or 
education on the importance of commercial item reliability testing early in the program; a 
culture-driven decision to save the program time/money; or the lack of training and/or 
education, enabling the mistaken belief that management’s edict to use commercial items 
voids the need for verifying the reliability of commercial items through testing. 
b. Support Requirements 
Issue: Incorrect/Inadequate program support concept is selected. 
The U.S. Army Audit Agency report of 11 September 1990 indicated that 
for the sake of expediency, the end-item contractor was to have provided both 
maintenance and supply support for the expected life-cycle for seven of the ten projects 
reviewed. The reason for lack of adequate logistics support in this case was most likely 
culture-driven to save the program time and/or money. Lack of training and/or education, 
related to the importance of establishing and justifying support concepts, also could have 
played a role.  
c. Technical Data for Competitive Reprocurement 
The U.S. Army Audit Agency report of 17 June 1991 indicated that 14 
projects reviewed did not acquire technical data suitable for reprocurement of spare parts 
or systems. The causes for not obtaining technical data suitable for competitive 
reprocurement of parts are attributed to: lack of training and/or education regarding the 
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importance and difficulty of obtaining commercial item technical data; or culture-driven 
decisions to save the program money during the acquisition phase. 
D. COMMERCIAL ITEM - CAUSE - SUMMARY 
In the table below, the problems/issues are listed as risks, along with the potential 
consequence of the unresolved risk, and their possible causes, as identified in this 
chapter. 
  Table 2   Commercial Item Cause Matrix 
 
  RISK         POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCE           POSSIBLE CAUSE 
 
Needs Determination 






-  Requirements 
allowed to grow, i.e., 
requirements are gold 
plated. 
 
-  Need unsatisfied; wrong 
product produced and 
purchased; DoD resources 
wasted; possible program 
elimination. 
 
- “Best value” solution will 
not be produced; impacts to 
cost, schedule, technical 
performance; DoD resources 
wasted. 
 
- No acquisition planning/risk 
analysis performed; inadequate 
training/education; unclear 
ORD; IPTs not used; culture-
driven decisions; no product 
standardization; no centralized 
database; inflexible reqmts.     
-No acquisition planning/IPT; 
needs allowed to grow too 
easily; inadequate ORD; 







- Items procured without key 
acquisition phases complete; 
impacts to program cost, 
schedule and technical 
performance; DoD resources 
wasted. 
 
-  Lessons learned not utilized; 
no evaluation of streamlining 










- Wrong item procured, “best 
value” item not procured; 
impact to cost, schedule and 
technical performance; DoD 
resources wasted. 
 
- No early, robust, market 
investigation performed; 
inadequate training/education; 
no centralized database/lessons 
learned; inadequate funding. 
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Table 2 (continued)      Commercial Item Cause Matrix 
 
   RISK          POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCE          POSSIBLE CAUSE 
 
Concept Formulation 
-  Inadequate or no concept 
formulation package 
prepared. 
-  Best technical solution 
not selected; impact to cost, 
schedule and technical 
performance; DoD 
resources wasted. 
- Inadequate training/ 




- A risk analysis was not 
performed. 
- Impact to cost, schedule 
and technical performance; 
DoD resources wasted; the 
program may be eliminated.
- No early, robust, market 
investigation performed; 
inadequate training / 
education / or use of lessons 
learned; widespread 
misunderstanding of the 
complexity of integration. 
Manage Integration 
- Inaccurate assessment of 
program integration risk. 
- R&D, or T&E not 
performed; impact to cost, 
schedule and technical 
performance; DoD 
resources wasted; the 
program may be eliminated. 
 
- No early, robust, market 
investigation performed, 
inadequate training / 
education / or use of lessons 
learned; widespread 
misunderstanding of the 
complexity of integration. 
Test & Evaluation 
- Testing was inadequate or 
was not performed. 
- Best technical solution not 
developed; performance, 
reliability & maintainability 
goals not met; impact total 
LCC; operational suitability 
& effectiveness not proven; 
impacts to program cost, 
schedule, and technical 
performance; potential 
mission failure / program 





- Culture-driven poor 
decisions; inadequate 
training / education / or use 
of lessons learned; lack of 
funding. 
Design 
- The design was 
underestimated. 
 
- The design process was 
incorrectly accelerated. 
- The best design will not 
be completed; impacts to 
program cost, schedule and 
technical performance. 
- Impact to program cost, 
schedule and technical 
performance. 
- Inadequate training / 
education / or use of lessons 
learned; culture-driven poor 
decision. 




Table 2 (continued)         Commercial Item Cause Matrix 
 
      RISK           POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCE           POSSIBLE CAUSE 
 
Reliability 
- The program reliability 
was inadequate. 
 
- No quantitative reliability 
requirements established. 
 
- Contractor’s reliability 
estimates not verified. 
 
- Inadequate reliability 






- RAM is adversely 
impacted; program’s total 
LCC is adversely impacted; 
potential mission failure; 








- Poor culture-driven 
decision; inadequate 
training / education / use of 





- Incorrect program support 




- Inadequate logistics 
support is planned. 
- Inability to support the 
system during a wartime 
environment; mission 
failure; program’s total 
LCC is adversely impacted; 
DoD resources are wasted. 
 
- Sub optimal logistics 
support, increased system 
LCC, DoD resources 
wasted. 
- Poor culture-driven 
decisions; inadequate 
training / education / use of 
lessons learned; 
misunderstanding of the 
schedule needed for 
logistics even for CIs/NDIs. 
- Insufficient time allotted 
for logistics support 
planning / preparation; 
EMD phase eliminated. 
Tech Data - Competitive 
Reprocurement 
- Data adequate for 
reprocurement is not 
obtained. 
 
- A sole source vendor must 
be used; reprocurement 
costs increased; an inability 
to obtain parts; potential 
mission failure; DoD 
resources are wasted. 
 
 
- Poor culture-driven 
decisions; inadequate 































V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this thesis has been to study the problems and issues experienced 
by PMs and industries utilizing commercial items in their programs. To explore this 
subject, the researcher has reviewed and analyzed the history of problems and issues 
experienced by acquisition programs using commercial items in their programs. This 
chapter presents the conclusions of this thesis, offering recommended best practices for 
utilizing commercial items on a program, as well as suggesting areas for further research. 
B. METHODS AND PROCESSES “BEST PRACTICE” CONCLUSIONS 
It appears that many mistakes or decisions have been made due to the fact that the 
decision-makers thought they understood the process leading them to make the correct 
streamlining decision. That is, they thought that their expertise would enable them to 
bypass certain requirements, or to ‘streamline’ the process for the purpose of saving time 
and money, but instead costed their program both time and money due to the resultant 
errors.  
1. Lessons Learned 
It is imperative to learn from our mistakes. There are many lessons to be learned 
from the various governmental audits and reports, and from the use of commercial items 
in each of the services.  These lessons learned should be accumulated in a centralized 
database available to the military service PM community as a web site, and should also 
be taught in various acquisition courses. This database website should incorporate market 
investigation, research material, lessons learned, and the “best practices” to use in 
particular situations and circumstances. It should be not only an information database 
website, but also a website for learning about the unique aspects of using commercial 
items in the acquisition process 
2. Culture-Driven Mistakes 
As noted previously in Chapter III, section seven, PMs have occasionally been 
driven by culture to make negative and flawed decisions that have adversely impacted 
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their programs, and occasionally their careers.  In order to change these negative results, 
it is necessary to change the basic culture and reward system that impinges upon the 
PMs’ world.  
The PM-test community relationship is a vivid example of the adverse impacts of 
the wrong culture and reward system at work. Rather than Congress killing a program 
because it has failed testing, the discovery of technical problems during early testing 
instead of during production should be rewarded, before the cost to fix such technical 
problems becomes increasingly expensive and time consuming.  
To foster a true and lasting attitudinal change of the PMs’ aversion to T&E within 
the acquisition realm, it will be necessary to change the current culture and reward 
system. The acquisition of knowledge through testing, and the subsequent increase of a 
product’s technological maturity, must be viewed by everyone in the acquisition 
community as a good and desirable result, and rewarded accordingly. For example, DT 
programs that first mature their technologies through adequate testing, thus allowing their 
programs to enter the production phase with subsequent low-risk technologies, should be 
rewarded by full funding and continuation of their programs. On the other hand, 
programs that attempt to enter production with high to medium-risk technologies should 
be penalized.   
In many cases the PM/PMO is well aware of and sensitive to the issues faced but 
the institutional biases are overwhelming and cause them to make poor decisions. 
3. Training and Education 
Training and education is extremely important within the acquisition community. 
The military makes the higher education and leadership training of their personnel a 
career-long endeavor. However, within the DoD civilian community that is not 
necessarily the case, and this must change. The acquisition of major weapon systems is 
the most complex environment within DoD, and all of its personnel must be adequately 
trained and educated continuously in order to master its intricacies, maintain current 
knowledge and execute the acquisition process properly.   
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There appear to be large gaps within the education process, especially concerning 
the use of commercial items and nondevelopmental items within DoD acquisition 
programs. Policy drives the acquisition process and is far ahead of the education of its 
disciples, especially for commercial item usage. There is inadequate training for user 
personnel to learn how to write performance-based requirements. There is no risk 
management training oriented toward commercial item/nondevelopmental item usage. 
There has been inadequate market investigation training. The acquisition training and 
education process should be critically examined for such voids and the deficiencies 
corrected. 
Training and education alone will not correct the DoD commercial item usage 
problems. It is imperative that the “culture” within DoD that drives PMs to make 
negative, self-defeating decisions be addressed and changed. The culture and reward 
system must promote and reward good decisions. A research article by a professor at the 
Naval Postgraduate School about the effect of training on changing the culture within 
DoD inventory management noted, “To be effective, it must be coupled with changes in 
other organizational design factors such as reward systems and management control 
systems. Training is only one of many inputs to organizational behavior. Trying to alter a 
culture by changing only one of these factors is usually a wasted effort.” [Kang, pg. 21]  
4. Needs Determination 
Users initiate an acquisition as they conduct the requirements generation process. 
User-led multifunctional teams need to be formed as early as possible to assist the user in 
fully grasping the nature, potential limitations, and advantages of available commercial 
items. Only through an adequate understanding of the advantages of commercial items 
can the users and acquisition community embrace the flexibility necessary in defining 
system requirements that will encourage greater consideration of commercial item usage.  
5. Acquisition Strategy 
It is critical that both the buying organizations and the acquisition community 
understand the importance of devising farsighted acquisition strategies, ones that 
adequately address the program uncertainties that can result from the use of commercial 
items.  Acquisition strategies should be devised to target those commercial item 
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uncertainties with the potential to impact product performance, quality, and logistical 
support.  
6. Market Investigation 
When market investigations are not conducted properly, it is possible that some 
potential alternatives will not be identified and investigated. Consequently, the best-value 
alternative might not be selected.  If the best-value is not selected, the result will lead to 
greater program cost and/or time, the selection of substandard technology, or the least 
supportable material solution.  
A good market investigation also would identify deficiencies in the commercial 
item that would require modification, and would determine the extent of that 
modification. Accurate determination of the necessary modifications is important; having 
to modify the selection more then anticipated would add both cost and time to the 
program. Extensive modification of commercial items within a program would take the 
product out of the category of a commercial item, thus increasing the program’s risk.  
Market investigation, along with concept formulation, is a key determiner of the 
acquisition strategy. If the market investigation is not performed properly, the selected 
acquisition strategy will probably not be the most effective and efficient one to use. 
Key personnel within the buying organization must be adequately trained and 
experienced in the market investigation process. In the Natick Laboratory case of the 
snow and ice-traversing equipment, a proper market investigation would have headed off 
the problems with the selected off-the-shelf items prior to acquiring and testing them. In 
the case of the field pack, a market investigation would have identified the deficiencies 
with the commercial pack, which subsequently required modification to such an extent 
that it bore no resemblance to the original commercial pack.  
7. Concept Formulation 
Without an adequate concept formulation package, which includes both a tradeoff 
determination and the best technical approach, it is unlikely that the best alternative will 
be selected. This will cost the program both time and money, and possibly forego the best 
technology as well. Since concept formulation is one of the determiners of the acquisition 
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strategy, incorrect concept formulation is likely to lead to a substandard acquisition 
strategy. As the Army Audit Agency states: “The concept formulation process should be 
conducted and documented for nondevelopmental items.” [U.S. Army Audit Agency, pg. 
23, 11 Sept 1990]  
Even in cases where management directs the use of commercial items, there are 
always tradeoffs and options that need to be identified, analyzed and evaluated to 
establish the best strategy for implementation.  
8. Risk Analysis 
Program risk will be different when using commercial items than in a traditional 
developmental acquisition program. Risk is fairly well defined for commercial items in 
the traditional areas of technical performance, cost and scheduling. For example, the 
commercial item market investigation will determine cost and technical performance, and 
delivery dates are subject to negotiation and discussion. In the areas of integration, 
operational suitability and supportability, however, risk analysis should be strongly 
emphasized, not eliminated. 
The risk that occurs during the integration of commercial parts must also be 
recognized, and program strategy to reduce or eliminate that risk should be established. 
Commercial items that are to be used in a military environment significantly 
different from that for which they are designed carry high risk. These items must be 
qualified in the operational environment in which they will be used.  
There is inherent supportability risk within the commercial realm due to the rapid 
change within the commercial marketplace, as previously discussed. This risk needs to be 
recognized and planned for in order to produce adequate total life-cycle support for the 
commercial item. 
9. Design 
The area of design cannot arbitrarily be rushed in order to speed up the program. 
Likewise, the use of commercial items does not necessarily mean that the design process 
has been reduced or streamlined.  In fact, the incorporation of commercial items into a 
design may be more difficult, because all of the design parameters of the commercial 
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item may not be known. This is an area that demands careful analysis before attempting 
to compress design schedules. 
10. Management of Integration 
There is widespread misunderstanding of the complexity of commercial item and 
nondevelopmental item integration into a program. Integration projects cannot be treated 
as normal low-risk commercial item acquisitions. Such integration efforts may not only 
require research and development, but also may need both a demonstration and a full-
scale development phase before production, unless the integration risk is determined to 
be sufficiently low. 
11.  Test and Evaluation 
Test and Evaluation (T&E) must be included in the evaluation of both commercial 
items and nondevelopmental items to ensure that operational suitability, reliability, 
availability and maintainability requirements are met. Only for commercial off-the-shelf 
items that are very low risk should developmental T&E be allowed to be eliminated and 
operational testing should always confirm the suitability of a commercial item in the 
military environment. As the Army Audit Agency indicates, “More effective up-front 
planning of independent test and evaluation is needed to ensure that enough data is 
obtained to fully evaluate the capabilities of new nondevelopmental items.” [U.S. Army 
Audit Agency, pg 28, 11 Sept. 1990]  
Testing should be performed on commercial items before and during production, 
unless a definitive decision verified by contractor data or previous tests adequately 
demonstrates the item’s acceptability. Sufficient data must be available to assess the 
critical testing issues of manpower and personnel integration, reliability, safety and 
supportability. Any decision to reduce or eliminate developmental testing should be 
based on independent evaluation reports that assess either the previous testing or other 
data to indicate how much testing will be required.  A GAO study found that a DoD 
weapon system frequently “experiences ‘late cycle churn’ or the scramble to fix a 
significant problem discovered late in development.” [GAO, pg 5, 31 July 2000] This 
‘late cycle churn’ is attributable to the inadequate exposure of technical problems early in 
the program via a robust test and evaluation process. 
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Operational testing of a commercial item in the military environment it will be 
used in order to verify operational suitability, effectiveness and performance should never 
be waived unless it will be used in the exact same environment for which it was designed. 
12. Logistics Support 
A significant problem concerning logistics support for commercial items has 
become apparent. Products are constantly being changed within the commercial item 
industry to keep contractors competitive. This constant change drastically affects the 
manufacturer support for older products. The manufacturer may no longer support older 
obsolete products, thus making replacement parts difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.  
As an Armed Forces Journal International magazine article puts it, “But today, the true 
cost of COTS is beginning to sink in. Sure, DoD’s R&D costs come down, but life-cycle 
costs under COTS need to substantially increase. Staying in step with the commercial 
world’s technology churn will require continuous mini-development efforts throughout a 
program’s life.” [Baker, pg4] 
The process of streamlining for commercial items or nondevelopmental items can 
result in the elimination of the Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) or 
System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase, which would normally include 
detailed logistics planning and acquisition of the necessary logistics support 
infrastructure. This may result in not allowing enough time for the logistics planning 
process in order to adequately develop and acquire the support materiel package, 
maintenance structure, organizational and support training packages, and writing of 
technical manuals. 
a. Reliability 
If a commercial item’s reliability, as stated by the vendor, is not verified 
as meeting the user’s requirements, then the system’s LCC may be severely impacted. 
Lower reliability greatly impacts the support costs, system availability, and thus the 
mission accomplishment.  RAM requirements must be established early in order to insure 
adequate testing and verification of the reliability of commercial or nondevelopmental 
items.  
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Since a commercial or nondevelopmental item has already been designed 
and developed, and its reliability already established, the reliability verification should be 
an operational assessment of the product within the military wartime environment in 
which it will be used. 
b. Support Requirements 
Because of the volatility of commercial items with respect to design 
changes, as previously mentioned, the availability of commercial item parts, components, 
or systems may cease before the intended military life-cycle of the commercial item 
expires. Therefore, support requirements must focus on the long-term maintenance and 
support of commercial items when fielded, because Government access to commercial 
item technical data will most likely be limited.  
c. Technical Data for Competitive Reprocurement 
Plans for access to data suitable for competitive reprocurement of 
commercial items are critical. Obsolescence within the commercial item marketplace is 
usually more rapid and unpredictable than it is for products developed specifically for the 
Government. The commercial item marketplace is more volatile; products can be dropped 
abruptly, or changed and businesses can go bankrupt or be bought out by other 
companies.  Without adequate planning for reprocurement, it is assured that there will be 
trouble within the program - and sooner then anyone might think. 
C. COMMERCIAL ITEM SUMMARY 
The inclusion of commercial items in the acquisition process is recognized as an 
opportunity to save both time and money.  But it is not the Holy Grail.  It can do all that 
everyone expects it to do, and may be an excellent solution in many cases, but its use 
should be as the result of careful analysis, reasoning and multi-functional study. As 
Carney and Oberndorf indicate in their research paper on the use of COTS to purchase 
software, “The critical point is that using COTS components in any given circumstance 
might help, but is not guaranteed to, and such use may even cause greater problems.”  
[pg. 1] They propose what they call the “ten commandments,” which must be considered 
when using COTS. All of these “commandments” apply directly to the use of commercial 
items other than software.  
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 For example, their first commandment, “One more time: Do not believe in Silver 
Bullets” [pg. 3] applies to this study, also. This has been reiterated in several contexts 
involving software, and certainly applies to the use of commercial item equipment in 
programs, as well. Anyone who believes that selection of a commercial item and 
inserting it into a program will be the quick fix believes in fairy tales, and does not really 
understand the process. 
The second commandment, “Use the term precisely (and demand like behavior 
from others)” [pg. 3] most certainly applies here. We have noted in this research that 
terms have been used differently in the past in the Army Audit Agency reports, and that 
Dr. Gansler specifically defined terms in order to bring uniformity to the terminology. 
Their third commandment, “Understand the impact of COTS products on the 
requirements and selection process” [pg. 4] equally applies to this research. It is 
important that commercial products are known and understood by those who establish 
requirements. The commercial marketplace must be clearly understood in order to have a 
flexible range of “requirements” sufficient to allow commercial items to qualify. 
The fourth commandment, “Understand the impact of COTS products on the 
integration process,” [pg. 5] certainly applies, as demonstrated by the various integration 
problems that have occurred within the various services and subsequently reported in the 
previously cited audits. There has been a tendency to assume that a commercial item can 
be used as-is, without any serious thought given to the difficulty and risk involved in the 
integration process. It has been assumed that the use of a commercial item alleviates all 
risk of integration. In fact, just the opposite may occur: commercial items may be even 
more difficult to integrate. 
Their fifth commandment, “Understand their impact on the testing process,”    
[pg. 6] also applies, as has been demonstrated by the problems experienced in 
commercial item testing. The validation of commercial items is different from the testing 
of development projects. This difference in the testing process must be clearly understood 
in order for validation of the commercial item to be correctly planned. Testing must then 
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be initiated early enough in the process in order to alleviate the great risk that occurs 
when it is performed too late. 
Their sixth commandment, “Realize that a COTS approach makes a system 
dependent on the COTS vendors,” [pg. 6] was exemplified in the Army Audit Agency 
report of 11 September 1990. This report found that in most cases, for the sake of 
expediency, PMs opted for the end-item contractor to provide the maintenance and 
supply support for the product. Vendor support must be examined critically for several 
reasons. First, it’s important to insure that the program doesn’t become too dependent on 
the vendor. Second, it must be determined that the vendor has sufficient technical data for 
adequate ongoing support. Third, it must be determined that the vendor has sufficient 
technical data for reprocurement of the product. Reprocurement is high-risk, made so by 
the probability that the commercial item vendor may change the product, or the product 
support, go out of business, be bought out by another company, etc. Contingency plans 
should therefore be developed for these possibilities. 
Their seventh commandment, “Realize that maintenance is not free,” [pg. 7] is 
exemplified by the Army Audit Agency 11 September 1990 report about the blind faith 
exhibited by the PMO concerning the cost effective vendor support of their products. 
This audit report has documented one of many instances where no analysis was 
performed to prove that contractor support was more cost-effective than the use of the 
military in-house organic support system.   
The eight commandment, “You are not absolved of the need to engineer the 
system well,” [pg. 8] has been displayed in every one of the issues studied in the previous 
chapter. Just because a product may be an off-the-shelf commercial item, there is no 
guarantee that it will integrate into the program’s system successfully. Nothing will come 
together and work by itself. The integration process must not be accidental, but rather, 
must be planned and executed purposefully. As has been seen in the previous problems in 
Chapter III, commercial items add another whole dimension to the difficulty of program 
management. Elimination of systems engineering in the commercial item acquisition 
process is not an option with the use of commercial items. As Carney notes, “This system 
will need to be designed, brought together, tested, and managed just the same as any 
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other system you have built or acquired in the past.” [pg 8]  Logistics supportability 
planning and execution should be added to Carney’s list. 
Their ninth commandment, “Just ‘doing COTS’ is not an automatic cost-saver,” 
[pg 8] has been alluded to throughout this thesis. There has been a lot of anecdotal 
evidence, as well as a few actual cases to substantiate the claim that use of commercial 
items saves both time and money. However, it is not a “given” that using a commercial 
item will always save time or money. The use of commercial items must be carefully 
planned, well engineered, and analyzed in depth. 
The tenth commandment, “Just ‘doing COTS’ must be part of a large-scale 
paradigm shift,” [pg. 9] was indicated in Chapter II, paragraph H, sections 1-7, of this 
thesis. Instead of the Traditional Model, as shown in Figure 2 of this thesis as being a 
waterfall acquisition process, it is now imperative that processes overlap and that greater 
use of IPTs be made in order to manage the uniqueness of commercial item usage, as 
portrayed in the Recommended Process – Figure 2. 
D. COMMERCIAL ITEM BEST PRACTICE SUMMARY 
The following table summarizes the problem/issue as a “risk,” the possible cause 
of the unresolved risk, and the best practice to follow to minimize the risk. 
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 Table 3 Commercial Item Best Practice Matrix 
 
    RISK                          POSSIBLE CAUSE  BEST PRACTICE 
 
Needs Determination 
-   User requirements are 
improperly identified, 






-  Requirements allowed to 
grow, i.e., requirements are 
gold plated. 
 




ORD; IPTs not used; 
culture-driven decisions; no 
product standardization; no 
centralized database; 
inflexible reqmts.  
-No acquisition 
planning/IPT; needs 





- Use IPTs; clearly written 
ORD; comprehensive 
acquisition planning; 
thorough market research; 
adequate acquisition 




- Use IPTs; clearly written 
ORD; comprehensive 
acquisition planning; 
thorough market research; 
freeze requirements or use 
P3I process to add needs. 
Acquisition Strategy 
- Incorrect streamlining 
acquisition strategy used. 
-  Lessons learned not 





-  Utilize lessons learned, 
closely evaluate stream-
lining decisions; provide 
adequate acquisition 
training and education; need 
comprehensive review of & 
change of culture paradigm. 
Market Investigations 
- Inadequate or no market 
investigation performed. 






- Perform robust market 
investigation early in the 
acquisition process; 
adequately trained 
personnel; use centralized 
database + lessons learned. 
Concept Formulation 
-  Inadequate or no concept 
formulation package 
prepared. 
- Inadequate training/ 
education/ or lessons 
learned; incorrect culture-
driven decisions. 
-Use lessons learned; 
adequately trained and 
educated personnel; need 
comprehensive review of & 
change of culture paradigm. 
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 Table 3 (continued)  Commercial Item Best Practice Matrix 
 
    RISK                          POSSIBLE CAUSE  BEST PRACTICE 
Risk Analysis 
- A risk analysis was not 
performed. 
- No early, robust, market 
investigation performed; 
inadequate training / 
education / or use of lessons 
learned; widespread 
misunderstanding of the 
complexity of integration. 
- Perform robust market 
investigation early in the 
systems acquisition process; 
adequate acquisition 
training and education; 
centralized database / use 
lessons learned. 
Manage Integration 
- Inaccurate assessment of 
program integration risk. 
- No early, robust, market 
investigation performed; 
inadequate training / 
education / or use of lessons 
learned; widespread 
misunderstanding of the 
complexity of integration. 
- Perform robust market 
investigation early in the 
systems acquisition process; 
adequately trained and 
educated personnel; 
centralized database / use 
lessons learned. 
Test & Evaluation 
- Testing was inadequate or 
was not performed. 
- Culture-driven poor 
decisions; inadequate 
training / education / or use 
of lessons learned; lack of 
funding; lack of resources. 
- Change the culture’s 
paradigm; adequately train 
and educate personnel; 
create centralized database / 
use lessons learned. 
Design 
- The design was 
underestimated. 
 
- The design process was 
incorrectly accelerated. 
 
- Inadequate training / 
education / or use of lessons 
learned; culture-driven poor 
decision. 






- Change the culture’s 
paradigm; adequately train 
and educate personnel; 
create centralized database / 
use lessons learned. 
Reliability 
- The program reliability 
was inadequate. 
- No quantitative reliability 
requirements established. 
- Contractor’s reliability 
estimates not verified. 
- Inadequate reliability 





- Poor culture-driven 
decisions; inadequate 
training / education / use of 









-  Change the culture’s 
paradigm; adequately train 
and educate personnel; 
create centralized database / 
use lessons learned. 
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              Table 3 (continued) Commercial Item Best Practice Matrix 
 
                  RISK                          POSSIBLE CAUSE  BEST PRACTICE 
Support Requirements 
- Incorrect program support 






- Inadequate logistics 
support is planned. 
 
- Poor culture–driven 
decisions; inadequate 
training / education / use of 
lessons learned; 
misunderstanding of the 
schedule needed for 
logistics even for CI/NDI 
items. 
 
- Insufficient time allotted 
for logistics support 
planning / preparation; 




- Change culture’s 
paradigm; adequately train 
and educate personnel; 
create centralized database / 






- Stretch phase to 
accommodate logistics 
support planning such as 
TMs, training, provisioning.
Tech Data - Competitive 
Reprocurement 
- Data adequate for 
reprocurement is not 
obtained. 
 
- Poor culture-driven 
decisions; inadequate 
training / education / use 




- Change culture’s 
paradigm; adequately train 
and educate personnel; 
create centralized database / 
use lessons learned 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
In order to reduce the time and cost of fielding new systems and inserting new 
technologies rapidly, the well thought out use of commercial items is imperative. 
However, the difficult new paradigm of using commercial items must be recognized, and 
acquisition personnel educated and trained for its efficient and effective use. The 
previous table of best practices is provided in order to highlight the major areas of risk 
that have been found to exist within the acquisition community. It also summarizes the 
best practices that will serve to minimize those risks. 
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F. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis identified areas that merit additional research, but did not address them 
because they were beyond the scope of this study. Those areas are as follows: 
1. An in-depth analysis of the cost-benefit relationship of using commercial 
items in acquisition programs. 
2. An examination of any existing barriers to using commercial items more 
efficiently in DoD acquisition programs. 
3. A comparative analysis of the problems associated with using commercial 
items versus the problems found in traditional acquisition programs to determine the 
significant differences, if any. 
4. An analysis of major defense acquisition programs’ potential of meeting 
the OSD commercial item goals that have been set for DoD. 
5. Identification of the extent the current PM community acquisition culture 
affects the PM’s correct usage of commercial items, the extent to which it contributes to 
the problems, and recommended corrective actions.  
6. Identification, via survey or other means, of the extent to which the 
“culture” in which the PM is immersed drives incorrect or inadequate decisions within 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ASA(AT&L) Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition Technology and  
 Logistics 
CI Commercial Item 
CINC Commander in Chief of a Unified Command 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations  
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoDD Department of Defense Directive 
DoDI Department of Defense Instruction 
DoDR Department of Defense Regulation 
DT Developmental Test 
DT&E Developmental Test & Evaluation 
DUSD(AR) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform 
EMD Engineering & Manufacturing Development 
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FASA Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
GOTS Government Off-the-Shelf 
GSA General Services Administration 
GSS  General Ships Specifications 
HQAMC Headquarters of the Army Material Command 
IFB Invitation for Bid 
IPPD Integrated Product and Process Development 
IPT Integrated Process Team 
LCC Life Cycle Cost 
LRIP Low-Rate Initial Production 
MIL-SPEC Military Specification 
MOA/MOU Memorandum of Agreement/Understanding 
NDI Nondevelopmental Item 
NSSC  Naval Sea Systems Command  
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NSWC  Naval Surface Warfare Center 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OT Operational Test 
OT&E Operational Test & Evaluation 
PEO Program Executive Officer 
PM Program Manager 
P3I Preplanned Product Improvement 
R&D Research and Development 
RDT&E Research, Development, Test & Evaluation 
RFP Request for Proposal 
RFQ Request for Quotation 
RIB  Rigid Inflatable Boat 
R&M Reliability and Maintainability 
SDD System Development and Demonstration 
T&E Test and Evaluation 
USAAA  U.S. Army Audit Agency 
USC United States Code 
USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  
 Logistics 
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